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I)r« J.L. Morris for his snpervision of this research an*̂  also 
to the other psychologists at the Wollonson^ University 
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incentive .#^0 
3*3* Tendency'' to approach success and tendency to 
avoid failure 98 
Relative strength of need achievement and fear 
of failure 29 
3*5. Conflict theorv as a basis for understanding 
behaviour in achievement situations ••••••••••••• 31 
The goal gradients 32 
3.7. The operation of the model 33 
3.8. Direct behavionral consefnences of the model 37 
3.9. Other behavionral implications 40 
Chapter TV» H;niothesis and Resultant Methodological Issues 
The measnreraent of achievement motix'̂ ation ••••••• 45 
The measurement of fear of failure 47 
4^3. The measurement of risk preference 48 
4.4. The subjects used 50 
4.5. Summary'' 53 
Chapter V. Method 
5.I. Subjects 56 
5*2• Apparatus 
5.2.1. The Revised Morgan Scale 56 
5.2.2. The Thematic Apperception Technifue 57 
5.2.3. Test Anxiet3r Questionnaire 58 
5.2.4. The quoits and related material 58 
5.2.5. The setting 58 
5 . 3 . Procedure 
5.3.1. Session one 58 
Session tvo 58 
5«3*3* Session three 59 
Session fonr 60 
Analysis of data 60 
5.4.1. Major hypothesis one 6l 
Major hypothesis two 6l 
5 « 3 » Major hypothesis three 6l 
5.4.4. The validity of the R.M.S 62 
5*4.5. The relationship between achievement and fear of 
failure measnres 62 
5.4.6. The effect of intelligence 62 
5.4.7. Sex differences in response 62 
Chapter VI. Results 
6.1. Major hypothesis 1 64 
6.2. Major hypothesis 2 6? 
6.3. Major hypothesis 3 6? 
6.4. The status of the Revised Morf^an Scale 68 
6.5. Other relations between measures 71 
6.6. The use of female subjects 71 
Chapter VII. Discussion 
7.1. Methodological issues 
7.1.1. The measurement of achievement motivation 73 
7.1.2. The measurement of fear of failure 
7.1.3. The measurement of risk preference 79 
7.1.4. The subjects used 81 
Results of najor Ir^otheses 
H^'-Dothesis one 83 
Hypothesis« two 84 
H3/pofhesis three 85 
7*3* Status of the objective stateTnent of the theor^^ 
of acbievement motivation 87 
7 * C o T T i n a r a t i v e utilit^^ of the snhjoctive enci objective 
nresentations of th*̂  t^eorr'* of achievement 
J.-. V 
Triotivation 91 
7 . ? . CoRclnsions 
Reference q6 
Appenr'ix 1 . . 111 
Appenr«ix 
\npeni^i- 3 I'^O 
Appenflix 4 . . . 1 P 8 
Annendix ^ . . . . . . . . ' ' 3 0 
- 1 -
ABSTRACT 
This thesis reports a revision of Atkinson's (1957,etc.) theory of 
achievement motivation undertaken in order to ensure that: all terms used 
were empirical in nature; relationships between terms uere more consistent 
with research findings; and the interaction of n Achievement with fear of 
failure uas expressed in terms of Flaher^s (1964) theory of conflict. 
Hypotheses derived from the revision: that in a game of skill median risk 
level chosen will be above .50 for the achievement oriented, below .50 
for the failure oriented and above .50 but between the other groups for 
the intermediate; that mean degree of risk chosen by a group correlates 
with group mean achievement orientation; and that an achievement oriented 
group will choose a higher risk level than a failure oriented group; were 
tested using 84 first year University students in a situation allowing 
subjects to assess their objective probability of success at various levels 
of task difficulty and to choose an objective level of risk preferred 
for assessment of performance. Measuring n Achievement by the T.A.T. and 
fear of failure by the T.A.Q., the first two hypotheses were confirmed 
and the disconfirmation of the third was marginal and readily traceable 
to difficulties inherent in the procedure. A slope index substituted for 
the T.A.T» failed to replicate the findings and the two measures of 
n Achievement were found to be uncorrelated. 
It was concluded that the revision of Atkinson's theory had received 
adequate support to justify the general theoretical procedure. Lines of 
enquiry, revealed by the revision, along which achievement motivation 
research could valuably be pursued, were discussed. 
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C H A P T E R I 
Introduction 
1 • The aim of the study 
Under the influence of McClelland and Atkinson, their co-iuorkers and 
students, research into the achievement motive has largely been undertaken 
within the framework of a single general conceptual system. This approach 
took specific form in the theory of achievement motivation first 
published by Atkinson in 1957, revised and extended since, and stated in 
a fairly complete form by Atkinson & Feather in 1955. 
It is true that a variant system of conceptualising achievement 
related behaviour has developed on the Continent under the influence of 
Heckhausen (see especially Heckhausen, 1957) however, as Heckhausen 
complained in 1968, its influence on the American theorists has been 
négligeable. 
The theory promulgated by Atkinson has been a very fruitful one in 
terms of the experimental research that it has generated. However, as a 
psychological theory it suffers from dependence upon a number of entirely 
subjectively defined variables which are in no way open to direct empirical 
investigation. At the time of the first formulation of the theory, this 
was only to be expected because of the obvious limitations upon knowledge 
of achievement behaviour. However, as one might expect from a theory 
which generated so much research, the new knowledge that was forthcoming 
has made it obvious that a restatement of the theory in more empirical 
terms was not just desirable, but also possible, and perhaps necessary. 
It is clear that any conceptual scheme relying heavily on non-empirical 
entities faces difficulties when required to predict the behaviour of 
factors open to empirical investigation» 
Uhile, in this thesis, Atkinson's theory must come in for criticism, 
it is to be realised that this is criticism in retrospect with a great 
deal more data to work upon than had Atkinson. Nevertheless, Atkinson's 
theory uiill be shown to be, in its present form, no longer adequate as a 
conceptual frameuork for research on achievement motivation and the major 
purpose of this paper is to present and test an alternative. 
In so doing, Atkinson's theory will still remain the basis upon which 
the alternative is constructed. However, those terms which are in his 
theory set to describe subjective states will be recast in an empirical 
form that makes them open to experimental testing. The relationships 
Atkinson postulated to exist between his variables will be evaluated on 
logical and empirical grounds, and also in the light of the changes which 
correspond with the change to objective variables. Those relationships 
which do not stand up uncer such an examination will be amendea to a form 
which is logically and empirically sound. Finally, as it has already been 
recognised by both Atkinson and Heckhausen that other theoretical areas 
can be related to the area of achievement motivation (specific cases will 
be described and referenced where relevant), but as the implications of 
this recognition have never been followed through, these implications will 
be explored to see whether they require a revision of the theory. 
The end product of this evaluative process will be a theory, in form 
similar to Atkinson's but which will obviate the problems associated with 
theories based on subjective variables. The advantages of an empirically 
cast theory over one based on non-empirical statements, will not at this 
stage be considered, but consideration uill be given to the gains inherent 
in a move to the former luhen evaluating the new theory with respect to its 
precursor, after first empirically testing the former. 
It will be demonstrated that the predictions which follou from the 
restated theory differ in some major respects from those to luhich Atkinson's 
theory leads. These predictions will be the basis of the empirical test 
of the theory. 
1.2. Limitations of the study. 
Research upon achievement motivation soon leads to a realisation of 
the hydraform nature of the problems. Each issue that is dealt uith gives 
rise immediately to new unanswered question; each line of thought is 
revealed as only the stem of a number of branching but interelated problems. 
Any study must of necessity be self limiting in this area as the 
problems themselves do not fall into a set of clearly defined separate iasues. 
Such limitation will mean the neglect of a number of questions that, for 
completeness, it would be desirable to be able to deal with. 
In this study it is considered necessary to restrict the research to 
the area of choice of preferred risk level amongst a series of possible 
choice levels. As will soon become clear, even so restricted, this is a 
very complex question. This has meant the acceptance of a number of 
propositions, which are themselves still matters of research, as being 
fully valid. For example, throughout the Thematic Apperception technique 
of assessing achievement motivation, developed by FicClelland (ncClelland, 
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), is accepted as the measure of n Achieve-
ment without written consideration of either its validity or reliability. 
This is not the result of lack of awareness of such issues, but rather of 
the need for brevity coupled with the need to give greater emphasis to 
issues more germaine to the central problem considered. 
The criterion for the consideration of a line of research or theory 
was at all points, except one, the degree of relevance of the issue to 
choice of a level of risk. The one exception was the evaluation of the 
slope index of achievement motivation (Morgan, 1964) which had the advan-
tages of being, as a theoretical issue, fairly insujfefced from other lines 
of enquiry, and as a practical problem, a simple question to resolve. 
So to save continual cross reference throughout the thesis, other 
issues of interest are best followed up initially in Atkinson & Feather 
(1966a) and Heckhausen (1967, 1968} which have the value of drawing 
together a wide range of research data from two divergent theoretical 
outlooks. 
C H A P T E R I I 
Presentation and Assessment of 
Atkinson»s Theory of Achievement Motivation 
2.1. Theoretical orientation 
Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation, first published in full 
in the Psychological Review of 1957, has its roots far earlier. Atkinson 
(1957) himself acknowledges a debt to Leuin (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & 
Sears, 1944), Rotter (1954) and Tolman (1955); and Feather (1959a) 
demonstrates a similarity of conceptualisation also in the uork of Ramsey 
(1931), Savage (1954), Coombs & Beardslee (1954) and Eduards (1954, 1955). 
In the formulation of the theory both the cognitive orientation of Tolman, 
Rotter and Leuiin and the mathematical orientation of the decision theorists 
clearly have their echoes. Uhile the basic nature of the theory has 
remained unchanged, Atkinson has, at times shoun a recognition of the need 
to re-evaluate the theory to account for new experimental findings, and a 
realisation of the relationship of his theory to other areas of 
psychology. (See Atkinson, 1966b; Atkinson & Feather, 1956b^ 
2.2. Atkinson's parameters and the assumed pattern of relationships. 
The cornerstone of the theory of achievement motive is that 
«motivation» (Atkinson, 1957), or »tendency» (Atkinson & Feather, 1966b), 
to behave in a certain uay is a multiplicative function of »motive», 
conceived of as "a disposition to strive for a certain kind of satisfaction, 
as a capacity for satisfaction in the attainment of a certain class of 
incentives (Atkinson, 1957, p.324)," of »expectancy», "a cognitive antici-
pation ...... that performance of some act will be followed by a particular 
consequence (ibid, p,323)," and of »incentive*, "the relative attractiveness 
of a specific goal that is offered in a situation or the relative 
unattractiveness of an event that might occur as the consequence of some 
act (ibid, p.323)." 
Behaviour in a situation where "performance is likely to be evaluated 
against some standard of excellence (ibid, p. 325)," assuming no other 
motivational tendencies are involved, can according to Atkinson & Feather 
(1966b) be predicted from the formula: 
Tg + = (1̂ 3 X P^ X I^) + (M^^ X P^ X I^) (p.333) 
uhere T is tendency to approach success, T „ is the inhibitory tendency s 
to avoid failure, M is achievement motive, P is subjective probability s s 
of success, incentive value of success, R^p motive to avoid failure, 
P^ subjective probability of failure and is the (negative) incentive 
value of failure, 
P and I are considered situation specific variables dependent upon s s 
the individuals past experience in similar situations (Atkinson, 1964). 
This relationship to an observable, past experience, Atkinson does not 
develop, but it will later be shoun to be invaluable in an attempt to 
reinterpret the theory in objective terms. P is assumed to be inversely 
proportional to perceived task difficulty and I inversely proportional 3 
to P . Atkinson taKes a similar approach to the expectancy of failure and 
s 
the incentive value of failure in that P^ is directly proportional to 
perceived task difficulty and inversely proportional to P^. 
These assumptions, if valid, mean that three of the four terms dealt 
uith are redundant as given, for instance P , one can immediately derive s 
P^, and and ail the runctions these serve in the fuii model. 
Atkinson is himseii ¿luare of this ana presents Lauarus* (1962) simplific-
ation of his theory: 
^s ^ ^f = ^"s - ^ F ^ ^ (Ps -
uith the assertion that this demonstrates "quite clearly that the theory of 
achievement motivation represents a specification of the personality and 
environmental determinants (Atkinson & Feather, 1966b, p. 333)." While 
the ^s ~ " ^s ^f ~ " ^f ^ss^^P^iof^s may be algebraically convenient 
and acceptable in a mathematical model, to consider this, as Atkinson 
seems to, as representing the »real* relationship betueen them is to assume 
that the causal factors underlying a person's judgement of probability of 
success are the same as those underlying his assessment of the incentive 
value of success, probability of failure and incentive value of failure. 
Heckhausen (1968) has argued that experimental evidence is far more 
consistent with an I = .7 - P assumption and cites Uendt (1967) in s s 
support of the possibility that linearity may also be an erroneous assumption. 
It uill be argued in this thesis that in fact the causal factors are 
not the same, and that the assumptions made about the relationship between 
expectancies and incentives needs to be related to these causal factors. 
To assume causal independence between these factors uill not necessarily 
destroy the model. Feather (1959a) provides evidence only for the 
accuracy of Atkinson's assumption about their relationships to perceived 
risk levels, and does not necessarily establish the interdependence of 
the factors. 
2.3. The functioning of the model. 
The multiplicative relationship of expectancy and incentive assumed 
in the theory leads to the conclusion that these make their strongest 
contribution to the tendencies to approach success and avoid failure 
at a lev/el of task difficulty equivalent to a .50 level of perceived 
risk (Atkinson, 1957). (Throughout, following Atkinson»s precedent, 
levels of risk uill be expressed in proportional terms). This multi-
plicative assumption is also explicit in Leuin's model (Leuin et al, 
1944) and Eduards« model (Edwards, 1955) and according to Feather (1959a) 
is also favoured by Tolman (1955) and Rotter (1954) and would seem to 
have justified itself by its experimental productivity. 
In this formulation, however, Atkinson has also assumed the independ-
ence of motive from expectation and incentive values. This assumption 
is open to question and Atkinson & Feather (1966b) make some attempt to 
incorporate this possibility into the theory. They do not pursue this 
to a reconsideration of their basic parameters and indeed express concern 
about the likely effects, considering that if such interrelationships are 
the case, "the theory is hopelessly entangled in a complex circuit of 
mutual influence (Atkinson & Feather, 1966b, p. 359)." It will be 
demonstrated later that, while such influences do complicate the model, 
they do not make it unworkable, and they produce important testable 
hypotheses. 
As both the motive to achieve success and the motive to avoid failure 
are assumed to be independent of task difficulty, their role in the model 
is to intensify the differential tendencies to perform already established 
by subjective probabilities and incentives but not to alter them in any 
way. This means that any slight tendency towards performance at a .5G 
level of perceived risk will be magnified in direct relationship to the 
strength of the motive. Thus both T and T . are strongest at the .50 
3 "I 
level and decrease in strength the easier or the more difficult the task 
becomes, and the stronger the underlying motive the more marked this 
effect becomes. 
2.4. The relationship betueen response tendencies. 
The relationship between T^ and T ^ is represented as being additive 
with representing a negative or inhibitory tendency. T^ is conceived 
as tending the subject to respond at, especially, a .50 level of risk, 
while inhibits this tendency. Atkinson entirely committed himself to 
the assumption of the inhibiting nature of the T ^ in 1964 (as against 
his 1957 paper) and specifically states: " the threat of failure does 
not directly excite avoidant actions or 'task - relevant' actions (sic.) 
(Atkinson, 1964, p. 246)." As T ^ is based on the motive to avoid failure, 
this involves a certain logical inconsistency, for perhaps the one common 
feature of motivational theories is that motive is always conceived of as 
related to the instigation and sustaining of behaviour, and not in terms 
of its inhibition, except in so far as it may instigate antagonistic 
responses. The intrinsic contradiction of this stance becomes obvious in 
consideration of the situation where T ^ exceeds T^, for although an 
inhibitory tendency may reduce a response to zero (in the model where 
T = T no meaning can be given to the concept of inhibition below zero. S " i 
Atkinson's utilization of extrinsic motivation to explain the fact that 
behaviour occurs (Atkinson, 1964), masks the practical difficulty, but not 
the logical. 
However, Atkinson (1964) provides the clue to a solution himself, by 
considering the situation as an example of approach-avoidance conflict. 
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lt would have been valuable had he pursued the implications of this, 
that T^ and T ^ are antagonistic behaviour tendencies which do not operate 
in an additive manner, but rather of which the stronger will occur. 
2.5« Behavioural implications of the model• 
However, on the basis of his assumed additive relationship between 
T^ and T ^ Atkinson is able to make certain predictions about choice of 
risk in an achievement related task. Where = ¡̂̂ ff whether they both be 
strong or weak, "there is no basis for predicting a risk preference, level 
of aspiration, or even performance of an achievement related task (Atkinson, 
1964, p. 247)." Where > n^P there will be a tendency to choose to 
perform at a .50 level and to perform most strongly at this level. If, 
however, < Atkinson (1964) says, the resultant is negative 
and strongest where P is .50. This implies avoidance or inhibition of s 
achievement related activities (p. 247)." While this could be taken to 
be an inconsistency after his rejection of the role of T ^ in exciting 
avoidant responses, it is more likely that he means that this level of 
risk will be avoided in favour of other levels and is thus referring to 
outcome not process. The need to provide some explanation for the fact 
that this group performs at all, led to the introduction of the concept 
of an 'extrinsic positive tendency (ibid, p. 247)' whose effects were again 
to be added to the resultant tendency (T + T „). This represented: S * r 
"..... the strength of the tendency to act which is attributable to the 
influence of other motives and incentives that are not intrinsically 
related to the evaluation of performance as are the two achievement-related 
motives (p. 247);" and was assumed to be unrelated to difficulty level. 
If this assumption does not hold, as Atkinson & O'Connor (1966) suggests, 
the use of extrinsic tendency as a basic factor in the theory is unfortu-
nate. Uhile it cannot be denied a role, it would be better if it could 
be treated as a complication and the entire model be made dependent only 
upon T^ and T It will be shoun that this is possible. 
Atkinson's theory, then, predicts a direct relationship betueen 
strength of response at a .50 level of risk and the degree to which fl̂  
exceeds n^p and an inverse relationship to the degree to which M^p exceeds 
2.6. Effect of success and failure on risk choice. 
Consistent with this basic theory is Atkinson's approach to the effects 
of success and failure upon the tendency to perform at various levels of 
risk. Persons where predominates, will gradually adjust their risk 
choices till they achieve a .50 level of risk, while those who are mainly 
failure motivated will either fixate at the level they first choose or may 
make »paradoxical* shifts from one extreme to the other. There is, of 
course, some difficulty in conceiving of a person suffering "continued 
failure at a very easy task (Atkinson, 1957, p. 336)" and some of the 
paradox is inherent in the confusion of subjective terminology. Although 
an increase in risk after failure is predicted from the theory, it is not, 
as Atkinson seems to imply, a shift from a high P , past intermediate P , s s 
to low P , but rather a movement from a low P^ (established by continued 
failure) to an even lower one. It is important to note that Atkinson (1957) 
saw this as occurring only if no easier choice levels were available. 
Nevertheless, the prediction of the operation of such atypical responses 
is valuable, especially if it can be related to objective rather than to 
subjectively defined risk levels, as risk taking behaviour is normally 
carried out against a background of previous success and failure. 
2.7. An attempted objectification of the theory. 
Atkinson has made some attempt to relate this theory to objective 
measures of difficulty in saying that, the relative strength of 
a motive influences the subjective probability of the consequence, 
consistent uith that motive, i.e. biases it upwards (Atkinson, 1957, p. 333)", 
That is, in "somewhat novel situations (ibid, p. 334)" subjects for uhom 
achievement motivation predominates should tend to prefer levels of 
objective risk somewhat higher than .50 while those for whom fear of 
failure is dominant should avoid a level of objective risk somewhat below 
.50. It is implied that as a subject discovers his objective probability 
of success he will adjust his subjective perception to correspond and so 
tend back to the .50 level. 
This seems to be a post hoc addition to the theory in the light of 
some earlier experimental studies (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, ^ 
Lowell, 1953; Pottharst, 1955), and is not derivable from the theory 
itself. In fact Heckhausen (195S) argues against the hypothesis on the 
ground that the supposed bias persists "even after they (subjects) have 
become intimately acquainted with their actual success probabilities 
(Heckhausen, 1963b; (sic) Decharms ¿c Dave, 1965), although there is a 
very occasional exception (e.g. Uendt, 1964) (p. 157)," 
It does suggest, however, some possibility of linking the theory to 
objective criteria, although a far more complete analysis must be made 
before a theoretical basis can be given to such predictions as Atkinson 
is making. 
2.3. The relationship of this study to Atkinson's theory. 
Although the theory of achievement motivation as formulated by 
Atkinson has led to some very valuable insights and relatively consistent 
experimental findings about risk taking behaviour, it is open to three 
major criticisms. 
The essentially subjective nature of the theory raises considerable 
methodological difficulties. Until such time as clear identities can be 
established between the subjective terms of theory and the operational 
terms of experimentation no definitive test of the theory, qua theory, 
is possible. 
Subjective level of risk, subjective probability or success and 
incentive value of success are each essentially unmeasurable and in the 
operational definitions of these terms it is often difficult to see the 
required relationship betueen the two types of construct. For instance, 
the common assumption that the median of levels of risk actually chosen 
in the experiment is useful as a definition of a .50 level of subjective 
risk is only justifiable if the result to be tested, that subjects group 
around a .50 level of risk, is first assumed to be true. The hypothesis 
uould still be confirmed even when = .70 - P^ (Heckhausen, 1958 pp. 
154 - 156) rather than I = 1 - P , so that subjects, in fact, grouped s s 
about a level of risk greater than .50. The possibility also remains open 
that an hypothesis falsified on one operational definition may be validated 
by a change in definition (e.g. Brody, 1963). 
Atkinson's (1957) argument that with practice subjective probability 
comes to be very highly correlated with objective probability, while having 
a high face validity, is also essentially untestable. 
The major thrust of this thesis uill be to restate Atkinson's theory 
of achiev/ement motivation uithin an objective frame of reference and to 
test the hypotheses generated by such a reformulation. This uill involve 
objectification of not only the parameters of the theory but also of the 
experimental methods of manipulating and assessing them. 
Atkinson's mathematical biases have also come in for criticism. 
Heckhausen (1967) states: "Aticinson's theory appears to be a mathematized 
calculus rather than a psychological model (p. 99)." Heckhausen seems 
to imply that a psychological model should not be mathematical uhich is 
not a valid assertion (Simon a- lieusll, 1955; Lachman, 196G). Houever, he 
does highlight the point that often Atkinson seems more concerned uith 
keeping his mathematical terms simple than uith reflecting behavioural 
reality. Instances have been demonstrated in outlining the theory. 
Mo attempt uill be made to avoid the basically mathematical nature 
of the model, houever, uhere a choice must be made betueen mathematical 
simplicity and behavioural reality, as far as possible the formulation of 
an adequate psychological rationale for the model has been given first 
priority. 
Finally, although Atkinson touches on other theoretical areas he has 
not uorked through to logical conclusions the consequences of their 
relationships to his oun theory. This is especially evident in the case 
of the approach-avoidance conflict he, like Heckhausen (1957), sees 
involved in risk choice (Atkinson, 1964). This thesis uill describe risk 
choice behaviour in an achievement situation as a specific case of conflict 
behaviour and represent such behaviour in terns of the parallel gradients 
model of approach-avoidance conflict (Haher, 1554). This uill also have 
the advantage of obviating the logical inconsistency (described earlier) 
uhich uas built into the model in its 1964 revision^ 
By formulating the theory of achievement motivation as a special case 
of an established theory uithin a behavioural orientation, and by giving 
a behavioural definition to all its terms, it becomes, most importantly, 
directly open to empirical testing, but also more closely allied to other 
areas of psychology. Such xitegration of theoretical positions has the 
value of allouing research findings made in relation to one area to be 
generalised to others, and removes many differences uhich, being 
terminological in nature, may uell prove to be pseudo-problems. 
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C H A P T E R I I I 
A Theory of Achievement Motivation 
Within an Objective Frame of Reference 
3.1. Expectancy and incentive 
The criticism of Atkinson's theory, in the previous chapter, 
emphasized the subjective nature of the terms he uses, and an initial 
task in an objective reformulation must be to clarify the nature of the 
parameters. 
To incorporate Atkinson's subjective probability of success, which 
is, as he states (Atkinson, 1957, p. 323) equivalent to the cognitive 
concept of expectancy, into an objective framework one must recognise it 
as a theoretical construct mediating the likelihood of the occurrence of 
different response patterns, and as having neither empirical nor onto-
logical status. The term 'expectancy» has been chosen for this variable, 
but this does not indicate that it is cognitive in nature. Rather, its 
preference over 'subjective probability' represents an intention to relate 
it firmly to both antecedent and consequent external events, as is always 
necessary with such hypothetical variables. 
The establishment of an expectancy is dependent on the pairing of 
certain stimuli and the effects of certain responses, and its operation 
in any environment depends on the similarity of that environment to the 
situation wherein it was established. Faced with an entirely novel task, 
an organism will have no specific expectancies to act upon; and in other 
cases the laws of generalisation will determine the degree to which expect-
ancies are transferable between similar situations. Across a multiplicity 
of achievement tasks an organism has established expectancies of success 
and failure, and expectancies in new achievement situations will be a 
function of the similarity of those situations to others where the 
organism has experienced success or failure. 
Thus in a situation where it has been possible to establish expect-
ancies of success and failure, it is possible to approximate a graph of 
the relation between these specific expectancies and objective difficulty 
or probability of success as proportional linear functions of the form 
E = P ° and E« = 1 - P ° where E is expectancy of success, P s s f s s * ^ " ^ ' s ' 
objective probability of success and E^, expectancy of failure. The 
accuracy of these functions depends entirely on the similarity between 
the situation where expectancy was established and the test situation. 
Their linearity assumes that expectancy is independent of motive strength, 
an assumption later to be qualified, with consequent changes in the graph, 
and the conclusion that E- = 1 - E is also only an artifact of this r S 
assumption. 
The second parameter, incentive, is not considered as necessarily the 
inverse of expectancy, but is separately related to its causal factors. 
It is again a theoretical construct representing the fact that the more 
difficult a task is, the more success at it is valued and the less failure 
at it is of negative value. This is learned from a past experience of 
greater reward for achievement at greater levels of difficulty and greater 
punishment for failure at relatively simple tasks, in terms particularly 
of parental, but also of others' praise and blame. Heckhausen's (1967) 
finding that the exercise of competence is itself reinforcing, possibly 
represents the development of this pattern into a secondary motive, and as 
the raore difficult the task is^ the greater uill be the competence 
exercised, the same pattern pertains. Again the laws of generalisation uill 
mediate the transference of this learned incentive from one task to 
another. So long as incentive is considered independent of motive strength 
a reasonable approximation, to the graphs relating the incentive values 
of success and failure (I and 1« respectively) to objective difficulty s 1 
can be represneted by the functions = 1 - and = 
although the assumption of linearity here is even more tenuous than for 
expectancies. 
At this time I have not considered Heckhausen's (1968) alternative 
possible function (I = .70 - P ) as, without specific experimental s s 
evidence to the contrary, the proportional relationships provide a 
theoretically more parsimonious structure. This is not to deny the 
validity of this proposal, (its incorporation into the present theory 
would only strengthen the conclusions to be drawn) but as Heckhausen 
is still theorising in subjective terms his proposition is no easier to 
test empirically than is Atkinson's. 
Although the form of the theory parallels Atkinson's model, certain 
useful departures from his approach have been incorporated. First, the 
use of theoretical constructs explicable in terms of observable ante-
cedent events to describe the relationship between stimuli and responses 
has replaced explanation in terms of entirely non-empirical constructs. 
Second, although expectancy and incentive maintain a measure of 
mathematical complementarity, this is fortuitous and as they are not 
necessarily based on the same causal factors, they are realistically 
defined as independently operating factors. Third, the accuracy of 
prediction based on these parameters, rather than being a constant, 
is specifically limited to the degree to which the situation in which 
prediction is to be made resembles the situation in which the 
expectancies and incentives were established. 
3.2. The interdependence of motive, expectancy and incentive 
The assumption of the independence of expectancy and incentive 
from motive strength is now rejected in favour of the alternative 
assumption that they interrelate. This reconsideration is justified 
in terms of the factors operative in the establishment of levels of 
achievement motive and of fear of failure. Because of the early 
appearance of achievement activities (Heckhausen & Roelofsen, 1962) and 
the relative consistency of the motive over time (Moss & Kagan, 1961) 
theorists have tended to relate its development to the child raising 
practices of the parents. U/hile considerable experimentation has been 
undertaken in order to formulate a description of the parent whose 
child tends to be high in achievement motivation (Drews & Teahan, 1957, 
though related to »achievement» per se; liiinterbottom, 1958; Rosen & 
D'Andrade, 1959; Crandall, Preston, & Robson, 1960; Rosen, 1961; Moss & 
Kagan, 1961), work on the origins of failure anxiety is far more limited 
(Sarason, Davidson, Lighthall, Waite, & Ruebush, 1960; McGhee & Teevan, 
1965; and indirectly Levin & Baldwin, 1959; and Paivio, 1964). 
Conceptualising achievement motive and fear of failure as two independent 
learned motives, four categories of parental behaviour need to be 
considered: that which will develop both motives to a high degree; that 
which will lead to a high achievement motive but not develop fear of 
failure; that which will produce the converse; and that which will fail 
to develop a great intensity of either motive. 
The achievement motive, being an approach motive, must be based 
on positive reinforcement for success, and fear of failure, being an 
avoidant related motive, based on negative reinforcement for failure. 
The bulk of the evidence strongly supports these contentions. 
Apart from a Japanese study (Hayashi & Yamaushi, 1964), whose 
discordant results are discussed by Heckhausen (1968), studies on 
the parents of high need achievers has shown them to be rewarding of 
independence and achievement behaviour, and as RcGhee a Teevan (1965) 
say, children "whose mothers were neutral following satisfactory 
behaviour and punishing following unsatisfactory behaviour had higher 
fear of failure motivation than those Ss (sic) whose mothers were 
rewarding and neutral, respectively (cited by Heckhausen, 1968, p. 134)." 
It is disappointing that no studies are available which 
simultaneously consider achievement motive and fear of failure in 
relation to child rearing practices, but extrapolating from the 
available studies, parents of children high on both motives reward 
success and punish failure; where only achievement motivation is high 
they reward success but do not react to failure; for the converse 
there is punishment for failure without reward for success; and where 
neither is high little reinforcement is available for achievement 
oriented activities. As the first three of these groups demand a 
similar thing of their children, i.e. success against some standard 
of excellence, many aspects of their behaviour are likely to be 
similar. 
From the child rearing practices of the parents, it follows that 
the child high on achievement motive and lou on fear of failure 
(hereafter 'achievement oriented') uill have received relatively 
more positive reinforcement for perceiving situations in achievement 
terms and for striving to excel in them. Beceause of this 
differentially greater tendency to strive in such situations, he uill 
have had more experience of success than children not achievement 
oriented, in situations of similar difficulty. His parents uill have 
encouraged him to overestimate, and reinforced him for overestimation 
of, his oun competence, and because of the greater effort he uill 
put into tasks, this overestimation may uell be self-reuarding in 
terms of the acquisition of increased competence, "Success-motivated 
Ss (sic) experience a degree of excellence as having 'demand quality' 
if it lies above their level of achievement, but only if it is 
slightly above, so that it can still be reached uith a concerted effort 
(Heckhausen, 1967, p. 24, cf. also his chapter on the origin and 
development of the achievement motive)." 
It therefore follous that a person high on achievement motive 
uill tend to overestimate his probability of success comparative to 
a person lou in achievement motive. This overestimation uill operate 
most pouerfully uhere the situation is most ambiguous (i.e. inter-
mediate task difficulty) as there uill be an increasing credibility 
factor operating as ue approach cither extreme of risk possibilities, 
that is, a person is more likely to knou those objective levels uhere 
he never succeeds or aluays succeeds, than the exact levels uhere he 
can succeed .5D or .60 of the time. This greater auareness of the 
objective situation uill limit the operation of the biasing effect. 
Houever, even if this assumption proves not to be the case, so that 
the factor postulated belou becomes monotonie relative to task 
difficulty, no major disruption to the theory is necessitated but 
only some variation in detail. 
Thus the expectancy function may be revised to E = P ° + j s s 
where 'j* is a small positive factor varying from person to person 
directly with strength of achievement motivation and varying in any 
situation from a limit of zero at the points where the task may 
always or may never be solved to a maximum at around a point of 
intermediate objective risk (.50). 
Similarly, it can be argued that the parent whose child becomes 
achievement oriented, by overestimating, and encouraging the child 
to overestimate his capacity for achievement, lessens the incentive 
value of success in any task by rewarding less and altering the child's 
own estimate of the difficulty of the task. The incentive function 
must then be written I = 1 + k - P ° where 'k' is a small negative 3 3 
factor with the same attributes as 'j'. 
Thus, on a theoretical level, assuming expectancy and incentive 
are related multiplicatively in their contribution to behaviour 
tendency, Atkinson's (1957) post hoc statement of the effects of 
relating achievement tendency to an objectively established base is 
justified. There will be a biasing of the point of maximum tendency 
to respond to a level of difficulty greater than .50, however, now 
this biasing can be directly related to the strength of the achievement 
motive (Figures 1 k 2. The simplest appropriate curve which will pass 
through three points, (0,0), (1,1) and (x,y), where x and y are both 
between G and 1, may be described by the formula (x - a)(y - b) = ab 
and the curves shown in Figures 1 & 2 and hereafter are developed 
from this basic equation.)» 
A number of studies (Pottharst, 1955; Kausler Trapp, 1958; 
Litwin, 1958; McClelland, 1958; Atkinson, Bastian, Earl, u Lituin, 
1960; Atkinson o: Lituin, 1960; Brody, 1963; DeCharms fc Dave, 1965; and 
Meyer, Heckhausen, & Kemmler, 1965) can be read as support for this 
theoretical position, though, because most of them are based on 
subjective values, they need not be so, Thoy do at least suggest 
the .50 assumption is tenuous even on subjective criteria, and for 
achievement oriented subjects levels above .50 are often chosen. 
The downward biasing of tendency to avoid failure predicted by 
Atkinson (1957) for subjects high in fear of failure has some inherent 
difficulties. High fear of failure, as suggested earlier, presupposes 
a history of negative reinforcement in achievement situations, which 
implies a consistent pattern of failure. An underestimation of 
competence will lead a person to succeed more often than he expects 
to, as he will tend to overstate the difficulty of his succeeding at 
tasks. Therefore, a tendency to underestimate, or even a realistic 
appraisal, of competence, would not normally result in the history 
of failure necessary to establish a high level of fear of failure 
motivation. Cn the contrary, what is requirGd is that the person 
overestimate his level of competence, so that he will fail to live up 
to his expectations for himself. Thus, although paradoxical, the view, 
that the person high on fear of failure overestimates his competence, 
is more consistent, on logical grounds, with the possibility of 
Task Difficulty. 
Fig.1. Theoretical values of 
expectancy and incentive value 
of success, and achievement 
tendency as functions of task 
diffk:ulty for low n Achievement, 
(max. j . 0, max. k . 0.) 
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Task Difficulty. 
Fig. 2. Theoretical values of 
expectancy and incentive value 
of success, and achievement 
tendency as functions of task 
difficulty for high n Achievement, 
(max. j . .2, max. k = .2.) 
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Fig. 3. Theoretk:at values of 
expectancy and incentive value 
of failure, and tendency to 
avoid failure, as functions 
of task difficulty for low fear 
of failure. 
(max. 1. 0, max. m = 0.) 
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Task Difficulty. 
Fig. 4. Theoretical values of 
expectancy and incentive value 
of failure, and tendency to 
avoid failure, as functions 
of task difficulty tor high fear 
of failure. 
(max. I = .2. max. m = .2.) 
establishing that high fear of failure, than is Atkinson's contrary 
suggestion. 
However, whereas the achievement oriented person uill strive 
harder to gain the reward (and so possibly do so), the person uith 
low achievement motive and high fear of failure (hereafter »failure 
oriented*) will be more likely to expend his energy defensively 
trying to leave the field and so lessen his chances of success. 
Moreover, as RcGhee & Teevan (1965) found, the achievement oriented 
subject will have been rewarded and not punished for striving in 
such a way, but the failure oriented subject will have been punished 
and not rewarded. b"o while the failure oriented person is like the 
achievement oriented in his overcstimation of his competence, 
he differs in that, because of his disposition to evaluate situations 
in terms of failure and punishment, he will try to avoid, or will be 
inhibited in, the situation and therefore if constrained to perform 
will tend to be even more likely to fail and reinforce further his 
fear of failure. 
The problem left to be resolved is why failure oriented subjects 
do not, therefore, alter their estimation of their competence downwards, 
as indeed Feather (1955) has argued they do. Lihile it is necessary 
to concur with Feather in his conclusion that there is "an autistic 
biassing of probability of success among subjects high in rl , s 
especially under conditions where I is high (i.e. wh3re the tasli is s 
presented as difficult), and a defensive biassing of these judgements 
among subjects who are high in H^p, especially under conditions where 
is high (i.e. where the task is presented as easy) (p.125)", his use 
of the term »defensive' may be argued. As he describes it, this 
latter biasing is an adaptive, rather than defensive, response 
to a history of failure. However, failure frustration is more 
likely to promote the truly »defensive» response of rigidity 
of attitude whereby the person's competence continues to be 
highly estimated despite constant evidence of lack of competence 
(cf. Maier, 1949, 1956, on frustration and fixation). Indeed, 
as previously argued, only such a proposition, that there is 
a defensive bias towards an overestimation of competence, is 
consistent with the establishment of high levels of fear of 
failure. Although Feather's (1965) evidence must be seen as 
initially in disagreement with this position, two factors 
should be weighed against this. First, the present theory is 
held to be applicable only when the subject is fully aware 
of, and has had experience in the situation, or a parallel. Feather's 
results only apply to initial choice and fade thereafter. 
Secondly, requiring the subjects to state an estimate of success 
probability before commencement of the task, raises the possibility 
that they interpreted the task as bther than Feather intended. 
If success in the task was interpreted as being in some way 
dependent on such ratings, subjects with high failure anxiety are 
likely to state an underestimation as this will increase the 
likelihood of their exceeding their stated estimate. As 
Atkinson & Feather (1966b) say: "it seems more consistent with 
the general theoretical position adopted to view any self 
descriptive verbal report as a complexly determined instrumental 
act and to undertake the task of explicit conceptual analysis of 
the determinants of this type of instrumental activity (p. 343)". 
Feather's study is not sufficiently unequivocal for it to be used 
to justify a theoretical position which is in doubt on a priori 
grounds. 
It is the assertion of this argument that, as the failure 
oriented subject must have experienced a history of failure, it 
follous that he normally overestimates his ability and therefore 
the expectancy and incentive functions must be corrected as uere 
those for achievement motivation except that the factor added to 
the expectancy function uill be negative and that added to the 
incentive function positive. (»1» and »m» uill be used to express 
these values). Resultant tendency co avoid failure, being the 
product of these tuo terms uill be biased upuards also, meaning 
that fear of failure uill exercise its strongest effects at a level 
above .5G (Figures 3 <1 4). 
On the basis of the argument so far, it can be concluded that, 
assuming a multiplicative relationship between them, expectancy and 
incentive effects are strongest, for both achievement desire and 
fear of failure, not at a .5C level of objective risk but at some 
point above that, depending on the strength of the appropriate motive. 
3.3. Tendency to approach success and tendency to avoid failure. 
As the complex relationships that exist between motive, expectancy 
and incentive have been controlled by incorporating them into the 
discussion of expectancy and incentive, motive to achieve success 
and motive to avoid failure may be dealt uith as simple uniform 
functions following Atkinson's pattern (see above). As implied 
earlier no better model for the interaction of the three parameters 
than Atkinson's multiplicative approach is available, for, despite 
a lack of any but a mathematical rationale for this, its predictive 
success has been high enough to justify its retention. 
Thus the relationship between resultant tendencies for success 
and failure and objective risk for various strengths of achievement 
and failure motivation will be of the form presented in Figures 5 
and 6. 
3.4. Relative strength of need achievement and fear of failure. 
To diagramatically and arithmetically present his theory, 
Atkinson is forced to create an arbitrary scale of strength for both 
need achievement and fear of failure (as was also necessary in Figures 
5 & 6 of this presentation). However, the assigning of equal units 
of strength to each results in the need to postulate a considerable 
degree of 'extrinsic motivation (Atkinson, 1964, p. 247)' to explain 
why those persons whose fear of failure exceeds their desire for 
success do not avoid performing altogether. 
Uhile not denying an important role to such extrinsic motivation, 
a more parsimonious explanation is that for the normal person the 
desire to achieve success is generally more potent than the fear of 
failure and that the latter is mainly a limitation on the former. 
That is not to say that for certain tasks the desire to avoid failure 
may not predominate in some individuals, however, in terms of general 
lifestyle, the alternative is to conceive of a personality where, 
unless constantly under external pressure, the individual will 
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Figs. 5 & 6. Tendency to strive for success and tendency 
to avoid failure as functions of task difficulty for five levels 
of achievement motive (Mg) and of fear of failure (Mf). 
(Assuming for convenience that the relationship between 
j' and k' and Mg can be expressed by the formula 
max. j = max. k = .OSMg arbitrary units and between T and 
'm' and Mf by the formula max. I = max. m = .05Mf arbitrary 
units.) 
inevitably avoid any axercise of conpetence. 
The assumption that for the najority of people the cccire to 
achieve is stronger allous the theory to be formulated in terns 
related entirely to achievement uithout the need to use extrinsic 
effects as explanatory concepts, (although for practical purposes 
these would still need to be considered), 
3.5, Conflict theory as a basis for understanding behaviour in achievs 
pent situations 
Given then that only tuo tendencies (to approach success and to 
avoid failure) arc initally involved, (as in practice At:<inson 
aluays has), the original theory arrives at the tendency to behave 
in terns of an additive relationship between these tuo. Yst, 
concurrently, both Atkinson (1954) and Heckhausen (irS7) recognise 
that it is in fact a conflict situation. To assert that conflict is 
involved is both to reject the concept of notivo to avoid failure as 
an inhibitor of behaviour, as the very definition of conflict 
(Leuiin, 1535; riiller, 1944; Yates, 1952; Kinble, 1954; Hahcr, 1959) 
is in terms of mutually exclusive 'response* tendencies; and also to 
reject the idea of an additive relationship betueen the tuo tendencies. 
There is great value in approaching the joint operation of tendency 
to approach success and tendency to avoid failure as an approach-
avoidance conflict, using as a basic frameuork naher's (1954) 'parallel 
gradients' revision of Hiller's (1944) theory of conflict. Haher's 
theory generates hypotiiesesnot directly available from Atkinson's 
presentation and its approach is much closer to the 'Zeitgeist' of 
modern psychology. Although ilaher's revision has been selected as a 
basis, niller's original theory would yield very similar results, 
so no attempt will be made to argue the relative merits of each, 
3.6« The goal gradients. 
The first prerequisite in such a presentation is again a 
specification of the nature of the parameters. The tendency to 
approach success T on any task is represented in terms of a 
s 
positive goal gradient (cf. Hiller's (1944) first postulate). There 
will be a different goal gradient for every level of task difficulty, 
having the same shape but being higher where T is higher. 
s 
Therefore, for subjects with high need achievement, the goal gradient 
to approach success, that is the gradient of approach to perform 
at a level of risk will be strongest at a point above .50, while 
for subjects with low need achievement it will be strongest at .50, 
and for each it will progressively diminish on either side of these 
points. As for all goal gradients, the gradient at any level of 
difficulty becomes stronger the closer (not necessarily spatially) 
the person come to responding, and so, a strong extrinsic 
orientation to one level of difficulty may bring a person to a 
position where the goal gradient for that level is stronger at that 
point than the maximum goal gradient is at the same point. This may 
cause him to experience the strongest approach tendencies to a 
difficulty level other than that representing maximal tendency to 
achieve. For this reason, every possible effort needs to be taken 
to avoid the operation of extrinsic factors in test situations. 
This is the major weakness of Atkinson & Litwin (i960), upon which 
evidence Atkinson leans fairly heavily (e.g. Atkinson, 1964), 
especially in the light of Atkinson & O'Connor (1966). 
A similar analysis pertains for the avoidance gradients based 
on fear of failure. Again the gradients are maximal at a point above 
.50 where the underlying motive is strong and approach a maximum at 
.50 as the motive lessens in strength. Again, for all levels of 
difficulty the gradients increase in strength with proximity to the 
goal point, (i .e. the level of risk chosen for performance). This 
is in accord with niller's (1944) second postulate. 
3.7 The operation of the model 
To demonstrate the dynamics of the model it will be necessary to 
consider the four cases derived by pairing high or low desire for 
achievement with high or low fear of failure'' in terms of the conflict 
between the resultant response tendencies to approach and avoid 
(Figures 7,8,9 & 10). 
In the »parallel gradients' model of conflict (Waher, 1964, 1966), 
the gradients of approach and avoidance are represented as 
diminishing at an equal rate with distance from the goal and conflict 
only occurs where the approach gradient is the higher. Instead of 
niller's (1944) »conflict point», there is a »zone of conflict» which 
stretches for a certain distance from the goal and the intensity of 
the conflict is dependent on the extent of this zone, which, in turn, 
depends jointly on the absolute and relative strengths of the two 
tendencies, as the organism passes into the zone at the point where 
the two tendencies become functionally equivalent and this is a 
function of the difference in the magnitude of the two tendencies 
High and low are defined within the single motive and not relative to 
one another as it has already been assumed that n Achievement is normally 
the more powerful motive. 
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Fig. 7. Strength! of resultant 
approach tendency (Tg) and 
avoidance tendency ( I f ) as 
functions of task difficulty for 
high n Achievement and low 
fear of failure. 







A B C D E 
Task Diff iculty. 
Fig. 8. Strength of resultant 
approach tendency (Tg) and 
avoidance tendency (Tf) as 
functions of task diffk:ulty for 
low n Achievement and high 
fear of failure. 
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Fig. 9. Strength of resultant 
approach tendency (Tg) and 
avoidance tendency (Tf) as 
functions of task diffk:ulty 
where both n Achievement and 
fear of failure are high. 
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Fig. 10. Strength of resultant 
approach tendency (Tg) and 
avoidance tendency (Tf) as 
functions of task difficulty 
where both n Achievement and 
fear of failure are low. 
relative to the absolute strength of either. If we apply this model 
to the case where achievement motive is high and fear of failure 
low, (Figure 7) we can graph the conflict situations at points 
A,B,C,D, and E and so demonstrate where along the scale of task 
difficulty the conflict involved in making a decision to act is 
minimal (Figures 11-15). 
It is clear that the most extensive, and therefore most intense, 
conflict zone applies at low risk (p ° = .85, Fig. 11) and the conflict s 
becomes easier to resolve as we approach a point of moderately high 
risk (P ° = .35, Fig. 14) and then becomes more troublesome as the s 
task continues to increase in difficulty. Thus, when constrained 
to perform at some level of risk ^he individual will be able to do 
so with minimal exposure to conflict at a moderately high level of 
risk. Bowever, an intermediate (.50) level of risk will still be 
preferred to either extreme of risk. 
M similar analysis of Figure 8, that is of the situation con-
fronting the person of low achievement desire Dut higher fear of 
failure will reveal that moderately low risk levels involve least 
conflict and so will be preferred in the constrained situation, and 
that overall, the conflict level will be higher and the differences 
between task difficulty levels less marked than in the converse 
motivational case. Haximal conflict will occur at moderately high 
risk and at greater risk levels the tendency to respond must be 
assessed in terms of the strength of the avoidance response. 
liihere both motives are strong (Figure 9) there will be a 
differential tendency to prefer moderately high risks, however, the 
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Figs. 11.12, 13. 14 & 15. Goal gradients of 
approach (solid line) and avoidance (dotted line) 
for high n Achievement, low fear of failure, at 
points A (Fig. 11). B (Fig. 12). C (Fig. 13). D (Fig. 14) 
and E (Fig. 15) derived from Fig. 7. 
greater than where only achievement desire is strong. Where both 
motives are weak (Figure 10) preference luill be for an intermediate 
level of risk uith a low conflict level and small differences between 
various risk alternatives. 
Therefore, the strength of ultimate tendency to respond at 
various risk levels for these four alternatives can be graphed as in 
Figure 16, however, the relative strength of these tendencies are 
assigned somewhat arbitrarily in the graph. 
As the actual probability of response at any level of risk 
depends not only on the absolute strength of the tendency to respond 
at that level but also on the relative strengths of tendency to 
respond at all other levels, the probabilities of response at each 
level for the four alternatives may be represented as in figure 17, 
(Areas under each of the curves have been equalised.). 
3.8. Direct behavioural consequences of the model 
Making the justifiable assumption that people tend to choose to 
perform in such a way as to minimise conflict and so avoid levels of 
risk where conflict experienced is great we are able to specify some 
conclusions about the objective risk levels people will prefer and it 
becomes clear that more complex relationships are involved than 
Atkinson's presentation suggests. Often, in fact, the conclusions are 
directly at variance with the original conclusions. 
Whereas Atkinson represents the resultant tendency curves as 
symmetrical around .50 it is now asserted that relative to objective 
criteria the achievement oriented curve is negatively skewed with its 
mode at a point below .50. This means that the achievement oriented 
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Fig. 16. Theoretical curves representing the ultimate tendency to respond 
at all levels of task d i f f icu l ty for subjects who are achievement oriented 
(solid thick line), failure oriented (dotted thick line), high on both motives 
(solid thin line), and low on both motives (dotted thin line). 
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Task Dif f icul ty. 
Fig. 17. Probability of the occurrence of a response at all levels 
of task di f f icul ty for subjects who are achievement oriented 
(solid thick line), failure oriented (dotted thick line), high on both 
motives (solid thin line) and low on both motives (dotted thin line). 
person will tend to take greater risk than the failure oriented 
person. The findings that the achievement oriented person is more 
likely to prefer 'intermediate» subjective risk and the failure 
motivated person to avoid it (Lituin, 1958; Atkinson & Lituiin, 
1950: Brody, 1963; Littig, 1963) is possibly attributable to the 
fact that subjects high on both motive prefer the same objective risk 
to those where achievement motivation dominates, and where both are 
low a .50 level of risk is chosen. If an overall median is taken it 
will be closer to the median value of the achievement motivated 
group than to that of the failure motivated group. Thus the former 
will seem less dispersed from »intermediate» risk. In fact, as 
figure 17 shows, the distribution of the failure oriented is the more 
leptokurtic in form and it is the position of that mode, and the 
second mode at very high risk that is responsible for the apparently 
greater dispersion. However, the intermediate groups are more 
dispersed around their own mode than either the achievement or failure 
oriented, although differences are not great. 
It has been assumed hitherto that there is always conflict 
between the approach and avoidance tendencies. However, within a 
conflict theory framework, it is clear that if achievement motive 
is sufficiently greater than fear of failure, there will be no 
conflict at all, as no conflict zone will exist. As the difference 
between tendency to achieve and tendency to avoid failure increases, 
this area of no conflict will spread from moderately high risk towards 
both extremes. 
Unlike Atkinson's theory where an increased discrepancy leads to 
an intensification of the tendency to intermediate risk, this 
suggests that there is an optimal level beyond which several levels 
of risk may be reached without conflict and extrinsic variable 
will become much more important in the specification of risk choice. 
Other motives, or simple spatial orientation may be the deciding 
factors. 
If fear of failure exceeds achievement motive in its effects 
for all levels of risk, then, without a clear specification of the 
effects of extrinsic motivation, no prediction is possible. This 
varies from Atkinson's suggestion that extrinsic motive can simply 
be added as a single value to all risk levels and the predictions 
made from the theory once some positive tendency was established. 
3.9. Other behavioural implications. 
Atkinson's conclusion that, with experience of success and 
failure, achievement oriented subjects will adjust their level of 
response to an intermediate risk level is confirmed, with the 
qualification that the adjustment is to a level of risk somewhat 
above intermediate. 
Where fear of failure is high and achievement motive low 
(i.e. as this model suggests, where they are closely equivalent) 
the picture is more complex. If the person chooses and succeeds at 
a low level of risk, unless it is extremely low (e.g. P ° below .10) 
there will be little tendency for him to change this, although he 
will slowly adjust towards moderately low risk. Success at inter-
mediate risk may well produce Atkinson's 'paradoxical' decrease in 
risk but only until the appropriate moderately low risk is achieved. 
Failure at what was assumed to be a low risk will normally lead 
to a rapid lowering of risk level chosen to a level consistent with 
moderately low risk. However, in the event of such a reaction being 
impossible there are two possible alternatives which may be predicted. 
The first is fixation at the same risk level as a result of 
frustration; but more likely is the reaction predicted from Figures 
8 and 16» As the avoidant tendency comes closer to equality with 
the approach tendency (Figure 8 ) then conflict increases, to the point 
where (in Figure 15) the resultant tendency to respondreaches zero 
as the approach and avoidance tendencies negate each other* But 
as soon as the avoidance tendency exceeds the approach tendency by 
an appreciable amount (as it may for very high levels of risk when 
fear of failure is close to the desire to achieve in strength) then 
response is made entirely to it and the person will seek the point 
where it is least strong. This means, as shown in Figure 16 that 
it is possible for the ultimate tendency to perform for this group 
to rise again at very high levels of risk. Thus a failure oriented 
person whose pattern of failure suggests moderately high risk may 
increase their risk level if it is impossible to decrease it. 
Unlike the subjective presentation of the theory, it must be 
assumed that there will not be deliberate choice of risk levels above 
.50 and the appearance of such choices in certain individuals will 
suggest either an extraordinarily high level of fear of failure 
relative to achievement motivation or the operation of over-riding 
extrinsic, factors. Ploreover, contrary to Atkinson's approach, failure 
at a supposed intermediate level of risk will only rarely lead to 
an increase in risk level. 
Thus the major differences in the approach here presented 
from that of Atkinson are that atypical increases in risk will be a 
rare occurrence relative to atypical decreases in risk, and further 
that the changes with regard to low level of risk operate identically 
with the changes for achievement oriented subjects but with a 
different point of maximal tendency to respond. 
Moulton (1965) unfortunately presents no evidence on the 
direction of atypical shifts and so his results can be read in 
support of either position. However, his initial choice figures 
suggest some verification of the pattern in figure 16 with the 
exception that the failure oriented group is grouped closer to 
.50 than predicted. 
The theory of achievement motivation, as here presented, has 
the advantages of a closer relationship to other theories current in 
psychological thought and of an objective frame of reference. It 
is at variance with Atkinson's presentation at several points and 
the intention of the experiment described in this thesis is to 
evaluate these two approaches at some critical points of difference. 
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C H A P T E R I V 
Hypotheses and Resultant 
Methodological Issues 
The hypothesis which follows from the theory outlined in 
Chapter III is that the lev/el of preferred risk will increase with 
the degree to which achievement motivation exceeds failure anxiety 
(although the possible existence of supraoptimal levels has been 
foreshadowed) and that preferred level of risk will be somewhat 
above .50 for the achievement oriented, and somewhat below ,50 for 
the failure oriented. 
Three specific hypotheses which will enable a test to be made 
of the validity of the theory, may be derived from the above 
proposition and the argument which leads to it. 
Empirical curves of risk level chosen by achievement oriented 
and failure oriented groups should approximate in general form the 
theoretical curves developed in Chapter III (Figure 17) and therefore 
the median of the achievement oriented group will be expected to lie 
above .50 and that of the failure oriented group below .50. The 
median of an intermediate group, comprising the joint results of 
those high, or low, on both motives should lie between the medians 
of the achievement and failure oriented groups and slightly above .50. 
The median was preferred to the mode as the basis of comparison, as 
the small number of choice alternatives would make the mode too 
gross a measure, and also to the mean, as the theoretical likelihood 
of a few extremely high risk choices in the failure oriented group 
would bias the mean further than the median from the most commonly 
preferred level» 
Therefore the first hypothesis may be stated: that the median 
risk level chosen will be; (a) aboue ,50 for an achievement oriented 
orouDt (b^ below .50 for a failure oriented group; (c) above .50 
and between the medians of the achievement and failure oriented 
groups for a group whose orientation is intermediate between the 
two. 
In any single risk choice of any individual a wide range of 
motivational and situational factors would be expected to influence 
that particular choice. However, if subjects were arranged in groups 
ranging from extremely failure oriented, through intermediate to 
extremely achievement oriented, this would have the effect of 
diminishing the influence of the extraneous variables that affect 
an individual's choice, and thus, of clarifying the influence of 
achievement and failure orientation. If subjects are so grouped, the 
theory leads to the expectation that the level of risk chosen will 
increase with the degree to which achievement orientation is 
predominant over failure orientation. Thus the second hypothesis may 
be stated: that, based on group means rather than individual scores, 
degree of risk chosen is positively correlated with the degree to which 
achievement motivation predominates over fear of failure 
motivation. 
If this is true, especially as more extremely different groups 
are chosen, achievement oriented subjects will choose a higher mean 
level of risk than will failure oriented subjects. It is hypothesised: 
that an achievement oriented group of subjects will choose a 
significantly higher level of risk than a failure oriented group« 
Testing these hypotheses creates certain methodological problems 
which need to be considered before a detailed methodology can be 
developed. 
The measurement of achievement motivation» 
It has been normal in experiments of this kind to use a projective 
measure of achievement motivation such as the Thematic Apperception 
Technique (T.A.T.), devised by i^cClelland et al (1953) from Murray's 
Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943), or the French Test of 
Insight (French, 1955b, ly58). The former, which has the backing of 
more extensive theory and research (cf. Heckhausen, 1^67), was chosen 
for use. The scoring was carried out by a rater * experienced with the 
test as, despite the assurances in McClelland et al (1953, i.e. a 
.96 rank order correlation between experienced and inexperienced 
raters), the value, in terms of validity, of experience in rating 
projective material could not be overlooked. 
The difficulties inherent in the use of a projective measure led 
to the inclusion of a second measure of n Achievement, one pioneered 
by Morgan, (1964), because of the possibility it offers of an 
entirely objective measure of n Achievement, which still avoids some 
of the problems of self-rating questionnaires. While a theoretical 
case (Morgan, 1964) can be made for the generality of Morgan's 
technique, it gains its experimental support entirely in terms of 
socio-economic achievement striving (Strodtbeck, McDonald, & Rosen, 
\)r. 3.L. Morris who scored the tests has had considerable experience 
with McClelland«s measure and has demonstrated a high level of 
consistency with other experienced raters. 
1957; Morgan, 1964), and its predictive value in other risk related 
tasks is yet to be tested. 
Certain changes in the test were necessary to adapt it for 
Australian usage. Though the occupations chosen were as in the 
original, in three cases a terminological change was effected. 
•Flail Carrier« became 'Postman«, 'Bookkeeper« became «Clerk-Accountant« 
and«Drugstore Owner« was altered to «Pharmacist«. While the 
parallels are not perfect, as close a correspondence as possible 
was attempted. It was evident, moreover, that the N.O.R.C. 
occupational prestige scale (Barber, 1957) upon which Morgan based 
his ratings could no longer be used. Morgan, himself, noting the 
discrepancies between the N.O.R.C. ratings and his empirical values, 
commented; "A better index could presumably be developed by using 
the rankings from our study (1964, p. 248)." Extending this idea, 
in the present study each subject provided his own ranking for 
difficulty of succeeding in each occupation (this being more 
theoretically sound than a prestige rating which may involve many 
extrinsic factors), and it is against these rankings that his «value« 
ratings were evaluated, rather than an arbitrary external scale or 
group decision. The scale derived by this method will be referred 
to as the Revised Morgan Scale (R.M.S.). 
Morgan (1964) reports that his scale did not correlate with the 
T.A.T. in one study, and fails to detail support for his statemebt 
that: "Other attempts to correlate the two measures have been more 
successful (p. 251)." If the Morgan measure is to find acceptance as 
a measure of achievement motivation, it must either correlate with the 
T.A.T, or prove as adequate a predictor of behaviour. This requires 
the testing of the two hypotheses: that n Achievement scores based 
on the Revised Worgan Scale mill be positively correlated uith 
n Achievement scores based on the Thematic Apperception technique; 
and that the Revised Morgan Scale will alloui prediction of behaviour 
with equal certainty to the Thematic Apperception technique. Thus 
if the three major hypotheses are confirmed using the T.A.T., 
confirmation is also expected using the R.PI.S. The T.A.T., being 
widely accepted as a basically valid measure of n Achievement, is 
therefore used as the criterion for evaluating the R.M.S. 
4.2. The measurement of fear of failure. 
On the basis of the confidence of Atkinson and his co-workers; 
(Litwin, 1958,; Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; feather, 1961, 1963; Littig, 
1963; Woulton, 1965; etc.) in the Wandler-Sarason Test Anxiety 
Questionnaire (TAQ) (Handler & Sarason, 1952), the college form of 
that test was chosen for use in this study. It proved necessary to 
omit one question as inappropriate to Australian students. Although 
there is a considerable body of literature to suggest that the T.A.T. 
and T.A.Q. are uncorrelated (Litwin, 1958; Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; 
Brody, 1963; Atkinson 4 O^Connor, 1966; Smith, 1966), the occasional 
findings of a degree of correlation (Raphelson, 1957; Smith, 1966) 
and especially the suggestion (Smith, 1966) that this is closely 
related to conditions under which the tests were administrated, 
necessitated that the possibility of such correlations be assessed in 
this study. It is necessary also to establish the independence of the 
R.n.S. from the T.A.Q. 
4.3. The measurement of risk preference 
As the present theory of achievement motivation is stated, the 
hypotheses to be tested can only validly be so in a test situation in 
which the subject has had sufficient experience to establish soundly 
based expectations. However, to allow maximum control, it should also 
be a task in which prior experience, that is, experience of which the 
experimenter has limited knowledge, should be minimised. To meet 
the second of these requirements a quoits game (the American 'ring 
toss», as in Atkinson & Litwin, 1960) was selected as, although 
virtually everyone has at some time played quoits, very few people have 
an extensive achievement related experience of the game. Two subjects 
had to be omitted from the study, one who had played competition 
quoits and one who played socially every week. 
Because the subjects came to the situation with a minimum of 
specific expectations about their ability, in a practice session 
intended to fulfil the first requirement mentioned above, it was 
possible not only to directly establish their expectations on the 
basis of their own observed ability, but also by keeping a record of 
their ability, to allow the experimenter the closest possible know-
ledge of those expectations. This approach, also used by DeCharms & 
Dave (1955), brings subjective probability of success as close as 
possible to the objective probability, and thus, with some caution, it 
is possible to relate directly the level of risk chosen by the subjects, 
to their expectations. 
It is therefore possible to fulfil a further requirement of the 
theory, an objective framework, as an objective definition of risk 
level based on the subject's assessed ability will closely approx-
imate the subject's expectations. It is disappointing that, 
although DeCharms & Dave recognise this possibility in their 
•probability deviation» score, they give more weight to a measure 
of intermediate risk based on the group norm. 
In summary, by recording success and failure during an extended 
practice session, it becomes possible to record with a tolerable 
degree of accuracy the subject's expectation of success for various 
levels of objective task difficulty. For instance, if in practice 
a person succeeded on .50 of occasions at all distances tested between 
seven feet and nine feet from the quoits peg, but more often closer and 
less often further away, then that defines for that individual the 
range of intermediate risk. A similar, rationale applies for all 
other levels of risk. 
The preservation of a record of the subject's probability of 
success at different distances meant, further, that he could be 
required to choose a »level of risk» directly (as in DeCharms & 
Dave, 1965), rather than the experimenter having to draw inferences 
from his choice of distance (as in Atkinson & Litwin, 1960). On 
at least two occasions when subjects, without waiting for full 
instructions, chose distances at which to perform, they altered those 
choices when made aware of the probability of success involved. The 
choice of a distance can represent the effects of a multiplicity of 
factors, as exemplified by one of those two subjects who, on 
questionning, after the task was completed, about the change he had 
made, volunteered that he had felt 'comfortable' at the chosen distance 
but that when the low level of risk involved uas specified to him, 
he felt capable of success at a more difficult task. 
Unlike Atkinson & Lituin, but similarly to DeCharms & Dave, 
subjects were tested individually, despite the great increase in 
experimental time involved, largely because of the possibility of 
significant effects from the affiliation motive (Atkinson & O'Connor, 
1966). Though the very presence of an experimenter introduces an 
affiliation problem (Rosenthal, 1966), it is nevertheless important 
to at least eliminate the effects of peer group influences. (Note 
Atkinson & Lituiin's 'informal banter'). 
The subject uas only allowed one free choice of risk level as 
either a measure based on the averaging of a number of free choices 
(DeCharms & Dave have twenty test trials) or the acceptance of each 
of a series of consecutive choices (Atkinson & Litwin used ten for 
each subject) introduces the effects of a variety of factors such as 
the influence of success and failure on subsequent choices. Indeed, 
Atkinson & Litwin»s finding that achievement oriented subjects showed 
less dispersion in risk preference than failure oriented subjects may 
be attributed to the former being more easily able to adapt towards 
intermediate risk, than the latter, due to a greater flexibility of 
response. 
4.4. The subjects used. 
Allowing only one choice response raises considerably the number 
of subjects needed to develop usable figures in comparison, particularly, 
with Atkinson & Litwin's approach, and subjects needed to be able to 
attend three separate sessions of some duration. The insurmountable 
difficulties involved in finding a large enough section of the 
general population willing to so commit themselves, in association 
with the fact that there is no inherent limitation to the applic-
ability of the theory, led to the choice of a mised-sex group of 
undergraduate students. This choice, however, presupposed certain 
problems. 
Although evidence against a relationship between intelligence 
and achievement motive is considerable (Heckhausen, 1967 citing 
McClelland et al, 1953; French, 1955a; Krumboltz & Farquhar, 1957; 
McClelland, 1958; Weiss, Wertheimer, & Groesbeck, 1959; Hahone, 1960; 
Hayashi, Okamoto, & Habu, 1962; Bartmann, 1963; Caron, 1963; Vukovich, 
Heckhausen, & Von Hatzfeld, 1964; Smith, 1964) some studies do 
suggest such a relationship (French & Thomas, 1958; Fleyer et al, 1965; 
Robinson, 1961, 1964; all of whom used groups of high I.Q., and 
McClelland et al, 1953) and there is considerable evidence for a 
relationship to academic success (McClelland et al, 1953; Rosen, 1956; 
Weiss et al, 1959; Uhlinger & Stephens, 1960; Shaw, 1961; Robinson, 
1964; Meyer et al, 1965; but cf. Lowell in McClelland et al, 1953; 
Mitchell, 1961; Cole, Jacobs, Zubok, Fagot, & Hunter, 1962; Hayashi 
Okamoto, & Habu, 1962; Caron, 1963). Although the issue is unclear 
(see Heckhausen, 1967 for a discussion) the use of a limited range of 
intelligence seems unlikely to affect achievement motivation beyond a 
possible slight attenuation of the range towards higher levels. There 
seems to be no studies relating intelligence to fear of failure. So, 
at least initially, the only effect of the restricted range of intelligence 
assumed to be possible is an increased difficulty, probably slight, in 
obtaining significant differences due to restriction of the degree 
to which groups could differ in n Achievement and fear of failure. 
Intelligence test scores were available for most of the subjects, 
so the relationship between intelligence and n Achievement, as 
measured by the T.A.T. and R.W.S,, and fear of failure, as measured 
by the T.A.Q. was investigated to throw further light on this issue 
and to ensure that intelligence was not operating as an extraneous 
variable in this experiment. 
Most studies of achievement motivation have used only male 
students (mcClelland et al, 1953; French, 1955b; Atkinson & Reitman, 
1956; noulton, Raphelson, Kristofferson, & Atkinson, 1958; Feather, 
1959b; Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; Littig, 1963; Roulton, 1965; Smith, 
1966; Atkinson & O'Connor, 1966; etc.) although there are exceptions. 
(Atkinson, 1958b used females; ncClelland, 1958 and O'Connor, 
Atkinson & Horner, 1966 used mixed sex groups of children.) The 
preference for male subjects has its basis in the findings of Veroff 
(1950; described by McClelland et al, 1953) and Wilcox (1951; 
described by Veroff, Wilcox, & Atkinson, 1953 and McClelland et al, 
1953) that the increase in achievement imagery observed to occur 
with males in the 'achievement oriented' presentation of the T.A.T. 
relative to the neutral condition cannot be observed to occur with 
females. However, these findings, suggesting that the T.A.T. is an 
inappropriate instrument for use with females, have not been 
replicated elsewhere (Angelini, 1959; Hayashi & Habu, 1962; Heckhausen, 
1963), and Field (1951; reported by McClelland et al, 1953) has 
shown that the increase can be effected with females with a change in 
the nature of the instructions. Thus it appears that the projective 
measure may not be invalid for use with both sexes, houever, if an 
achievement oriented presentation is used great care must be taken to 
find an approach uhich uiill engage the achievement related schema of 
both sexes. Further to this, from one series of studies (Lesser, 
Krauitz, & Packard, 1963; French & Lesser, 1964) it is clear that 
intra-sex differences may be as significant as inter-sex differences 
and so a technic]ue needed to be developed to alloui subjects to 
provide their oun achievement orientation in light of their ouin 
achievement related values. 
Thus, the session where subjects completed the T.A.T. followed 
by between one and two weeks, the performance of the risk choice 
task. Immediately before starting the T.A.T., the subjects were 
required to write down a short description of how they had felt 
during the performance of the risk task, the rationale being that 
this would cause them to recall the achievement feelings and 
orientation intrinsic in the task situation, yet allow them to supply, 
even if implicitly, their own frame of reference for these feelings. 
To ensure that the use of a mixed-sex group had not seriously 
affected the experiment and especially to ascertain that males and 
females were performing consistently on the T.A.T., steps were taken 
to ascertain that male and female subjects did not differ in their 
mean response or dispersion of responses on the T.A.T., the R.n.S., 
the T.A.Q., or choice of risk level. 
4.5. Summary 
Three major hypotheses for testing were proposed in this Chapter. 
They were: 
Hypothesis 1. That the median risk level chosen will be: 
(a) above 0.5 for an achievement oriented group; 
(b) below 0,5 for a failure oriented group; 
(c) above 0.5 and between the medians of the achieve-
ment and failure oriented groups for a group whose 
orientation is intermediate between the two. 
Hypothesis 2. That, based on group means rather than individuâl 
scores, degree of risk chosen is positively correlated 
with the degree to which achievement motivation 
predominates over fear of failure motivation. 
Hypothesis 3. That an achievement oriented group of subjects will 
choose a significantly higher level of risk than a 
failure oriented group. 
These three hypotheses were to be tested using both the T.A.T. and 
R.n.S. to measure n Achievement allowing the efficacy of the R.M.S. to 
be tested by comparison with the T.A.T. in two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4. That n Achievement scores based on the Revised Morgan 
Scale will be positively correlated with n Achievement 
scores based on the Thematic Apperception technique. 
Hypothesis 5. That the Revised Morgan Scale will allow prediction of 
behaviour with equal certainty to the Thematic 
Apperception technique. 
Other methodological issues gave rise to nine minor hypotheses 
which were also tested relating to: the relationship between the T.A.Q. 
and (i) the T.A.T.; (ii) the R.M.S; the relationship between 
intelligence and (iii) the (iv) the R.n.S.; (v) the T.A.Q.; 
and the comparability of male and female responses on (vi) the 
T.A.T.; (vii) the R.Pl.S.; (viii) the T.A.Q,; and (ix) the risk 
choice. 
C H A P T E R V 
nethod 
The methodology of the study will be presented under four major 
headings: Subjects; Apparatus; Procedure and Analysis of data. 
5.1. Subjects. 
Of an original group of 121 students from the first year of an 
undergraduate course in Psychology, eighty-tuio were selected as the 
experimental sample, of whom thirty-three were males and forty-nine 
females. The remainder were rejected on at least one of the 
following grounds: they served as trial subjects to allow refinements 
in procedure; their ability against distance decay curve was too steep 
(from P ° = 1 t o P ° = 0 i n one foot); they were very experienced 
s s 
in quoit throwing; they were completely negative in the experimental 
task; they falsified responses on the T.A.Q.; or they failed to 
attend one or more of the experimental sessions. 
Scores on the ACER Advanced Test N (Australian Council of 
Educational Research, 1963) were available for seventy-two of these. 
All subjects were naive as to the theory of achievement motive, the 
intention of the experiment and the fact that the separate procedural 
steps were related. 
5.2. Apparatus. 
5.2.1. The Revised Horgan Scale. 
As it was used in this study, the R.n.S. consisted of three sheets: 
an «Occupational Difficulty Scale« (O.D.S.); an «Occupational Satis-
faction Scale' (O.S.S.)? and a work sheet. The O.D.S. required S's 
to rate the percentage to the nearest 5% of male third form students 
uiho could succeed at a list of nine occupations (based on Morgan, 1964) 
which were listed in alphabetical order (Appendix 1). The O.S.S, 
required students to rate how "most people would feel if a boy of 
theirs chose each of the same nine occupations as in the O.D.S,, 
using the same five point scale of response as Morgan (Appendix 1). 
The third sheet contained a pair of axes, the vertical titled 
tOccupational Satisfaction* and marked at equal intervals with the 
five scale points from the O.S.S., and the horizontal titled 
«Occupations in order of perceived difficulty from least to most 
difficulti and numbered from one to nine at equal intervals. Space 
was left for S^s to write in the nine occupations as they perceived 
them to increase in difficulty from the olti.S. The measure of n 
Achievement was computed as the tangent of the angle of the line of 
best fit (least squares method) of the points derived from graphing the 
value ratings for each subject against his ratings of difficulty 
(Appendix 1), and this value is the basis of all statistics related 
to the 
5.2.2. The Thematic Apperception Technique. 
Slides of the four pictures numbered in order 2, 1, 8, and 7 by 
Atkinson (1958a) were used in conjunction with foolscap response 
sheets containing the four questions McClelland et al (1953) adapted 
from Murray (1943) (Appendix 2). 
The slides were projected onto a screen for group presentation 
and the response sheets were scored according to 'Scoring System C» 
of WcClelland et al (1953). 
5.2.3. Test Anxiety Questionnaire. 
The college form of the Mandler-Sarason Test Anxiety Question-
naire (Wandler & Sarason, 1952) with the omission of question 15 as 
inappropriate to Australian conditions uas scored on a 10 point 
scale. (Appendix 3). 
5.2.4. The quoits and related material. 
Six rope quoits, six inches in external diameter, were thrown to 
a ten inch high peg, with diameter tapering from one inch to half 
an inch, five inches in advance of a vertical backing board. Two 
experimental instruction sheets (Appendix 4) were used with the quoits. 
5.2.5. The setting. 
A large store room was used with the quoits peg against the wall 
at one end and the floor marked in chalk at six inch intervals from 
the peg to a distance of twenty feet. A small table was placed to 
the side of the area used for the quoits. 
5.3. Procedure. 
5.3.1. Session one. 
In six class groups subjects were required to complete the O.D.S. 
from the R.Pl.S, under the supervision of an experimenter not otherwise 
involved in the experiment. 
5.3.2. Session two. 
One week later in the same groups, S's did the T.A.Q. and then the 
O.S.S. of the R.M.S. Their O.D.S. was returned and the work sheet 
relating it to the O.S.S. was then completed. 
5,3.3. Session three. 
Subjects were asked to volunteer to attend a fifteen minute 
private testing session within the two week period following session 
two. As each S entered the experimental room, he was shown the sheet 
headed 'Ring Toss Ability' and the instructions on the sheet were 
read and explained. (On the basis of several trial subjects, the 
instructions were changed insofar as the experimenter (E) pointed 
out that he would make the graph record as subjects found it difficult 
and time consuming to alternate between that and the quoits throwing.) 
Starting two feet from the peg, S was given eighteen practice throws 
at, initially, one foot intervals, but at six inch intervals in 
cases of rapid performance decline, as he retreated from the peg. 
Considering three throws as a 'unit', and defining success, in a 
unit as two quoits on the peg, (thus giving a score out of six on 
eighteen throws), it was possible to graph a decay of ability with 
distance curve for each S as he moved away from the peg. The 
practice session ended with no successes on two successive intervals. 
S was then shown the graph of his achievement at various distances 
and his likelihood of success at these distances was outlined. 
With the graph still before him, S was shown the sheet headed 
'Ability/Risk Judgement' and the appropriate instructions were read 
to him. Subjects who did not immediately understand were instructed 
again in the same general way although the examples were altered to 
probabilities of one in six and five in six, and the final 'motivating' 
comment was related to choice of levels of study in the W.S.U. Higher 
School Certificate. S was then required to choose a level of risk at 
which he would prefer to throw, (he was not allowed to choose a 
distance or favoured place,) and the shortest distance appropriate 
to that level of risk was derived from the graph. 
The subject then threw three quoits from that distance and the 
distance, the probability of success and number of quoits thrown 
onto the peg were recorded« The subject was allowed to leave 
after being asked not to talk about the task* 
Session four* 
In the first week following the end of session three occurences, 
S^s, again in their original class groups, were told that, as part 
of their course work, they were to be subjects of a projective 
personality measure, the T.A.T. While the projector was being 
focussed etc., subjects were asked to provide some written feedback on 
how they had felt and what they had thought during session three. The 
slides were then shown immediately following the recall of the 
achievement situation, using the timing and instructions suggested 
by McClelland et al (1953). 
5.4. Analysis of data. 
For each subject were available raw scores on the R.M.S., T.M.T., 
T.A.Q. and level of risk chosen, and for seventy-two subjects scores 
on the A.C.E.R. Advanced Test N were also available (Appendix 5). 
A composite achievement/failure orientation score was developed for 
each subject by transforming his scores on the T.A.T» and T.A.Q. to 
standard scores and subtracting the latter from the former. This 
was repeated using the R.n.S* and T.A.Q. All operations involving 
the "composite score' were executed on both these figures (so read 
hereafter). 
5.4.1. Major hypothesis one. 
Subjects uere ranked by composite score and on this basis 
divided into three equal groups, (yith the extra subject arbitrarily 
assigned to the central group)9 ideally representing achievement 
orientation, failure orientation and an intermediate group. The 
median risk level chosen by each group uias then computed. 
5.4.2. Major hypothesis tu;o. 
On the basis of composite score ranking subjects txiere divided 
into ten approximately equal groups. (The tuo extra subjects were 
assigned to the most intermediate groups). The mean composite score 
and the mean probability of success chosen for each of the groups 
uere found and correlated using a Pearson's product moment correlation. 
A significant negative correlation represented confirmation of the 
hypothesis. 
5.4.3. Major hypothesis three. 
The mean probability of success chosen by *achievement oriented^ 
groups uias subtracted from that of 'failure oriented*groups taking 
progressively more extreme definitions of achievement and failure 
orientation (i.e. median split, highest and lowest thirty-two subjects, 
twenty-four subjects, sixteen subjects and eight subjects. A 
student's 't' test of significance (one tailed) was applied to the 
differences between means so calculated. To fully confirm the 
hypothesis, the differences should steadily increase and the achieve-
ment oriented group should choose a significantly higher level of 
risk than the failure oriented group (i.e. a lower probability of 
success), especially, for the more extreme groups, 
5.4.4. The validity of the R.W.S. 
Subjects' scores on the R.M.S. were correlated with their scores 
on the T.A.T. using Pearson's product moment correlation to test the 
fourth hypothesis. A significant positive correlation was 
required for confirmation. 
The fifth hypothesis was tested indirectly by establishing 
whether the results gained using the R.(*I.S, in testing the major 
hypotheses were consistent with the results gained using the T^A.T. 
5.4.5. The relationship between achievement and fear of failure 
measures. 
To ensure the independence of the T.A.Q» from the T.A.T. and 
R.n.S. subjects^ scores on the former were separately correlated with 
each of the latter using Pearson's product moment correlation. No 
significant correlations were expected. In view of the doubt over 
the use of both sexes, the correlations were repeated for each sex 
separately. 
5.4.6. The effect of intelligence. 
The T.A.T., R.M.S. and T.A.Q., scores for the seventy-two 
subjects for whom intelligence test scores were available were 
correlated separately with those scores, again using Pearson's 
technique. Very small to insignificant correlations were expected. 
5.4.7. Sex differences in response. 
Male and Female mean scores and variances on the T.A.T., T.A.Q., 
R.n.S. and risk choice were compared using students 't' and the F 
distributions respectively to test for significance of differences. 
No significant differences were expected. 
C H A P T E R V I 
Results 
6,1, Plajor hypothesis 1« 
When n Achievement was assessed using the T.A.T, method, risk 
choice for a relatively achievement oriented, a relatively failure 
oriented and an intermediate group uere distributed as shown in Fig. 16* 
The means, medians and modes of these groups were as in Table 1. 
As indicated earlier the median was considered the most appropriate 
measure for the purposes of testing the first hypothesis and it is 
immediately apparent that the hypothesis is strongly confirmed. The 
objective probability of success chosen by the achievement oriented 
group represents a risk level of above ,50 and that chosen by the 
failure oriented group a level below .50. The intermediate group is 
both above .50 and between the medians of the other two groups. 
Thus the distribution of medians is precisely as stated in the 
hypothesis. 
Table 1. Mean, median and modal levels of chosen objective probability 
of success for three groups differing in the degree to which n Achieve-
ment or fear of failure motivation was the dominant motive. (T.A.T. 
and T.A.Q.) 
Mean Median Mode 
Achievement oriented .42 .44 .33 & .50* 
Intermediate .51 .48 .50 
Failure oriented .50 .52 .50 
For the achievement oriented group an equal number of subjects chose an 











1.00 .83 .67 .50 
Object ive Probabil ity 
.33 .17 .00 
of Success. 
Fig. 18. Frequency polygons of the 
numbers of subjects choosing 
various levels of risk for 
achievement oriented, failure 
oriented and intermediate groups, 
using the T. A. T. to measure 
n Achievement and the T. A.Q. to 












1.00 .83 .67 .50 .33 .17 .00 
Objective Probability of Success. 
Fig. 19. Frequency polygons of 
numbers of subjects choosing 
various levels of risk for 
achievement oriented, failure 
oriented and intermediate groups, 
using the R. M. S. to measure 
n Achievement and the T.A.Q. to 
measure fear of failure. 
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Achievement Orientation. 
(Standard Score Units.) 
Fig. 20. Observed relationship between mean degree of 
achievement or ientat ion of. and mean risk level chosen by. 
groups, showing the line of best f it through the points 
obtained, calculated using the method of least squares. 
The general nature of the distributions of risk choice uere 
similar to uhat might be predicted from Fig. 17, except at the 
extremes. The intermediate group had an unexpected number of subjects (3) 
choose an objective probability of success of 1.00 (reflected in the 
mean of 0.51), and the expected grouping of a number of failure 
oriented subjects at a very high risk level failed to appear. 
However, the small numbers electing the outermost levels of risk at 
either end render it unwise to draw any firm conclusions about the 
status of the revealed discrepancies. (3 subjects chose a probability 
of success of 1.00, 2 of 0.83, 6 of 0.17 and 2 of 0.00). 
When the R.H.S. was substituted for the T.A.T. the distributions 
for the same three groups were as in Fig. 19 and Table 2 is 
parallel to Table 1. The results thus obtained are similar to those 
obtained using the T.A.T. in that the medians follow the pattern 
predicted in the hypothesis. 
Table 2. Rean, median and modal levels of chosen objective probability 
of success for three groups differing in the degree to which n Achieve-
ment or fear of failure motivation was the dominant motive. (R.H.S. and 
T.A.Q.) 
Hean Median f'lode 
Achievement oriented .46 .45 .50 5: .33^ 
Intermediate .45 .47 .50 
Failure oriented .52 .52 .50 
i 
-X-
For the achievement oriented group an equal number of subjects chose an 
objective level of risk of .50 and .33 
The general nature of the distributions is again similar to the 
projection from Fig. 17 although the intermediate group's favouring o' 
a D»57 level of objective probability of success more often than a 
0.33 level is somewhat incongruous. Again the small numbers in 
extreme levels mitigates against any useful conclusions being draun 
about choices at these levels. 
6.2. Major Hypothesis 2. 
Confirmation of the second hypothesis, which stated that there 
was a positive relationship between the mean achievement orientation 
of a group (as defined in Chapter 4 and 5,4) and their mean choice of 
degree of risk, was very strong when the T.A.T. and T.A.Q. were the 
tests used but the hypothesis was not confirmed for the R.H.S, and T.A.Q, 
In the former case the mean composite score for groups established 
according to their ranking on that composite score, showed a high 
negative correlation with the mean choice of objective probability 
of success of the groups (r = -.76 which is significant beyond a ,005 
level for a one tailed test). Thus variation in achievement 
orientation accounts for 57.76^o of the variance between groups on 
risk choice. The strength of this relationship is further demonstrated 
in Fig. 20. 
Substituting the R.H.S. for the T.A.T. lowers the correlation to 
r = -.30 which is not significant at a .05 level for a one tailed 
test and which would indicate that only 9/j of variance between groups 
on risk choice would be accounted for by variation in achievement 
orientation. 
6.3. Ha.ior Hypothesis 3. 
Uhen the T.A.T, was used to measure n Achievement, as the 
difference between the groups defined as achievement oriented and 
failure oriented increased, so did the difference between their 
mean choice of objective probability of success, as is shown in 
Table 3. As is also shown, the differences in mean risk level 
chosen gave »f values throughout which failed to exceed a .05 
level of significance. Nevertheless, the differences became 
increasingly close to significance as the groups became more extremely 
differentiated and where the top and bottom sixteen subjects were 
considered only barely failed to achieve significance (critical 
value of for d.f. = 30 is 1.697 and the obtained t value was 
1.6899). So although the results are not strong enough to allow the 
acceptance of the hypothesis, these results need to be evaluated in 
the light of the method which, by allowing to each subject only one 
choice in one situation, inflates the effects of extraneous variables 
which operate in any single situation. Therefore, a hasty rejection 
of the hypothesis on the basis of this failure alone would be 
inappropriate. 
The situation is less complex when the R.I^.S. was used to measure 
n Achievement as the predicted trend failed to appear (Table 4) and 
on the only occasion on which the difference approached significance, 
the difference between the groups on achievement and failure 
orientation was at one of the least extreme levels. 
6.4. The status of the Revised Worqan Scale. 
As Table 5 indicates, the correlation between the T.A.T. and R.n.S. 
proved to be very small. Neither the combined groups correlation of 
.07, nor either of the single sex correlations (.18 for males and 
-.07 for females) proved significant, and so Hypothesis 4 must be 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and tests of significance of difference between means of choice 
of risk level for various definitions of achievement oriented and failure oriented groups where the 














































.5625 .1740 .4167 .1864 .1458 1.5124 <.10 
Table 4. Weans, standard deviations and tests of significance of difference between means of choice 
of risk level for various definitions of achievement oriented and failure oriented groups, where the 













































.4583 .1843 .4375 .1136 .0208 .2543 <.45 
o 
rejected. 
Despite the confirmation of Hypothesis 1 using the R.n.S., its 
failure to parallel the results of using the T.A.T. in Hypothesis 2 
and 3 must lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 5, 
Other relations bettneen measures« 
Neither the T.A.T. nor the R.M.S. showed any relationship to 
the T.A.Q» (Table 5). It is therefore valid to assume that the 
measures of n Achievement and fear of failure in this study were 
independent. 
Nor were any significant relationships found between any of the 
three motivational measures and intelligence. Correlation 
coefficients based on the A.C.E.R, Advanced Test N were .01 for the 
T.A.T., -.06 for the R.Pl.S. and -.13 for the T.A.Q. 
Table 5. Correlations between the Thematic Apperception Technique, 
Revised Morgan Scale and Test Anxiety Questionnaire for males, females 
and combined groups found between these measure and intelligence. 
Tests Correlated r (males) r (females) r (combined) 
T.A.T. and R.M.S. .18 -.07 .07 
T.A.T. and T.A.Q. -.04 .14 .06 
R.n.S. and T.A.Q. .22 -.12 .06 
6.6. The use of female subjects. 
Males and females did not differ significantly in mean score for 
any of the motivational measures, nor for risk choice (Table 6). 
However, they did differ in dispersion of scores on the R.Fl.S. (p < .02) 
and on risk choice (p <.05). In each case the scores for males 
showed most dispersion (Table 5). The latter difference does not 
affect the validity of the testing of the three major hypotheses as 
no differences were found for either the T.A.T. or T.A.Q. 
Table 6. Results of t tests of significance of difference between 
means and F tests of significance of differences between variances 
for males and females of the T.A.T., R^M.S., T.A.Q. and choice of 
risk level. 
T.A.T, R.n.s. T.A.Q. Risk 
Choice 
Mean for males 7.4848 .3891 171.5454 .4646 
(*lean for females 7.2245 .4363 170.6735 .4864 
t .2503 1.2620 .0862 .4877 
P > .8 > .2 > .9 > .6 
Variance for males 44.2576 .0475 1993.6307 .0558 
Variance for females 33.9694 .0146 2032.1828 .0275 
F 1.3029 3.2534 1.0193 2.0291 
P > .1 < .02 > .1 < .05 
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C H A P T E R V I I 
Discussion 
7,1. fiBthodoloqical issues. 
7.1.1. The measurement of achievement motivation. 
The change in the method of presentation of the T.A.T. 
necessitated by the use of a mixed group of subjects did not 
prevent the test from working effectively, as evidenced by a high 
level of achievement content in the protocols (cf. Appendix 5), 
suggesting that the procedure parallels the *achievement oriented 
condition» of McClelland et al (1953). 
The attempt to establish the S.Pl.S. as a valid measure of n 
Achievement proved less successful. No significant correlation was 
found between n Achievement scores derived from the T.A.T. and those 
derived from the R.n.S. This failure to verify hypothesis 4 is in 
accord with the results cited by Morgan (1964). 
His explanation for the failure of the tests to correlate is 
that the occupations were in general below the interest level of the 
university students used as subjects. In support of this he points 
out that his student sample had twice as many percent in the group 
scoring above .35 on the test as the national sample did, and that 
none scored below .15 as against 22% of the broader sample. Similarly, 
in this study, the sample of students had 3.5 times as many percent 
in the group scoring above .35 as the U.S. national sample and only 
about one sixth of the percentage of that sample scoring below .15. 
Furthermore, if one takes the mean value ratings from the national 
sample (Table 7) and calculates an n Achievement score by graphing 
these against the N.O.R.C, rankings (Table 8) a »typical^ score 
for that sample is derived as .27. If as Morgan, following Atkinson 
(1966a), suggests, the order is taken not from the N.O.R.C. ratings 
but from the value ratings themselves (Table 8), which seems to 
beg the question of the relationship of value to difficulty, this 
Hypical' score rises to only .29. If however, the mean value 
ratings in this study (Table 7) are similarly graphed against the 
most common difficulty ratings found (Table 8), the 'typical* score 
is found to be .44 which is well in excess of that of the national 
sample. 
liihile this can be seen as clear evidence of a difference between 
the student samples and the national sample in how they score on the 
Morgan Test, it argues against the explanation of the differences 
Morgan proposed. The effect of the occupations being below the 
interest level of the student sample would be to depress the value 
ratings of all these occupations (especially those at the lower end 
of the scale) and thus to depress the score that the subjects would 
gain on the test. But clearly the evidence shows that it is 
augmented rather than depressed, relative to the general population. 
As difficulty, (or in Morgan's study, prestige) is fixed on an equal 
interval scale, only a move towards a regular increase in value from 
one occupation to the next will cause the increase discovered in the 
student samples. 
From Table 7 it is clear that the major contributing factor in 
this change is an increase in the value ratings students give to the 
Table 7. Plean occupational value ratings of parents on a five point 
scale derived from this study and the national sample in the U.S. 
reported by morgan (1964). 
Occupation University sample U.S, National sample 
Night Watchman 1.32 1.25 
Automechanic 2.42 2.31 











High School Teacher 3.91 3.19 
Doctor 4.59 3.96 
top three or four occupations. To some extent this may be accounted 
for by terminology changes, however, that it also applied to 'High 
School Teacher' and 'Doctor' argues against that as a total explanation. 
It is proposed that, rather than the occupations being below the 
interest levels of students, differences between the two samples' value 
ratings for the lower occupations being small and as often in favour 
of the student as the national sample, the explanation for the 
difference lies in the more limited range of occupational horizon of 
a large section of a nationally selected sample. For most university 
Table 8. Ranking of occupations on the N.O^R.C, scale, the mean value 
ratings from morgan's (1964) study, and the most usual difficulty 
ratings in this study• 

























High School Teacher 
Pharmacist 
Doctor 
students the occupations at the higher end of the scale represent a 
real possibility. For a considerable number within a national sample 
such occupations will be high above what they consider possible for 
themselves and their children and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957) will tend to cause these high prestige occupations to be lowered 
in prestige to a level closer to the respondents' own occupational 
levels. 
If such a factor does account for the lower ratings in the national 
sample, that is, if values are partially arranged in order to 
maximise, within the limits of credibility, the value of occupations 
of similar status to the respondents' occupation, relative to those 
higher in general conwiunity prestige, then the relationships Morgan 
reports between scores on the scale and occupational groups can be 
accommodated without reference to n Achievement. Occupation groups 
with higher prestige will suffer less dissonance and so scores 
on the test will increase as morgan found. That the results 
can be so explained is necessary if the T.A.T. measures n Achieve-
ment and the slope index of Morgan is not correlated with the T.A.T. 
Thus, following the rejection of Hypothesis 4, it must be 
assumed that the is not measuring the same factor as the T.A.T. 
and that Morgan's (1964) results are better explained in terms 
of cognitive dissonance theory than as a result of differing 
n Achievement levels. This assumption is further strengthened by 
the rejection of Hypothesis 5. 
Despite a superficial similarity between T.A.T. results and 
R.n.S. results on Hypothesis 1, the failure of the R.H.S. to 
replicate the results obtained using the T.A.T. on the other major 
hypotheses, must lead to the rejection of an hypothesis which asserts 
the equivalence in predictive utility of the two tests. 
However, the failure of the R.n.S. should not necessarily be 
attributed to invalidity of the general idea of a slope index, but 
rather to the specific form in which this method has been used to 
date. As the difference between Morgaños national sample and university 
samples suggests, the test as at present formulated, is easily 
influenced by extraneous factors. In the present case the two 
most important would seem to be sex and socio-economic factors. 
The wider dispersion of males than females on the test, suggesting 
that it is discriminating more finely amongst males than amongst 
females, is traceable to a strong masculine bias in the test itself. 
Not only did the instructions relate the test only to third form boys 
but five of the nine occupations are, in Australia, peculiarly male 
domains. In the same way as the original 'achievement oriented' 
presentation of the T.A.T, did not engage the need achievement 
of female students (Veroff, 1950; Wilcox, 1951), the female students 
can avoid projecting their own achievement need into the situation 
to a far greater extent than can the male students. 
A related but more serious limitation is the restriction of the 
present form of the test to vocational achievement. Even disregarding 
the difficulties discussed earlier this is a far too restrictive approach 
to such a general motivational factor. As Anstey (1965) points out, 
such a test must represent an adequate sampling of the fields of 
achievement striving, or else one must seek a test which measures 
achievement without specific reference to any particular areas at all, 
as seems essentially to be the case with the T.A.T. 
The general method of the slope index, having a sound theoretical 
rationale, as well as practical features, to recommend it, should 
not be too swiftly set aside. A form more consistent with the 
requirements listed above is likely to generate results comparable 
with those found using the T.A.T. 
Nevertheless, the R.f'l.S. has not been established as a useful 
measure of n Achievement, and so hereafter this discussion will 
concentrate only on results obtained using the T.A.T. as the measure 
of achievement motivation. 
7.I.Z. The measurement of fear of faixure. 
As was predicted the T.A.Q. was correlated with neither the T.A.T. 
nor R.n.S. It is clear, as earlier studies have reported (Litwin, 1958; 
Atkinson & Litwin, 1960; etc.), that fear of failure, as measured by 
the T.A.Q, is a factor independent of the achievement motive as 
measured by the T.A.T. Similarly, the R.W.S, is not measuring any 
significant êlement of failure anxiety. 
It may seem gratuitous to question the value of a test which has 
been consistently used in studies of n Achievement and has repeatedly 
shown itself capable of providing an adequate predictive criterion 
for fear of failure. Yet informal discussion with the subjects of 
this experiment has suggested that an alternative test to the T.A.Q. 
is desirable. Many subjects reported having felt the test was not 
very serious because of the apparent triviality of such questions as 
those on perspiration and heartbeat, especially as they felt they could 
do no more than guess the answers to these questions. An even 
larger number reported that they found the test to be boring. 
It is unknown to what degree the unfortunate attitudes in the 
subjects thus engendered may affect their performance on other areas 
of the experiment. Certainly the development of a test which would 
give comparable results, but have a greater degree of 'credibility' 
and interest value, could only be an advantage. 
7.1.3. The measurement of risk preference. 
As a consequence of the use of trial subjects, it became evident 
that the situation was more complex for the subjects than the written 
instructions presupposed. This difficulty was overcome by allowing 
the instructions to be re-explained, as outlined in the procedure. 
Thereafter, no major problems arose in the conduct of the task (save 
for the fatigue suffered by the experimenter due to retrieving well 
over one hundred quoits for each subject). Host subjects expressed 
involvement in the task and understood clearly what uias expected of 
them. Three subjects had to be omitted from the results when they 
clearly and deliberately threw to miss, making a valid assessment 
of their abilities impossible. 
The experimental situation revealed an inherent weakness when on 
a feu occasions a subject's ability decreased from complete success 
to complete failure within a distance of a foot or less. The 
smallest space between throwing points being six inches, in this 
situation at least four of the seven risk levels had to be defined 
by extrapolation. As the maximum difference between risk levels 
had to be no more than two inches risk levels so derived cannot be 
held to have any real validity. Fortunately, the number of subjects 
so excluded was small. 
Although the experimental task was certainly effective in most 
instances, certain practicalities suggest an alternative task would 
be preferable for future research. Individual testing of subjects 
demanded a great deal of time (circa thirty hours in all), and a 
task which could be administered in a group situation, yet to 
individuals would be far more economical. Especially when using 
students, a less 'manual' and more 'intellectual' task would have 
advantages as being more intrinsically achievement related. 
Nevertheless, the basic method: choosing a task to which the 
subjects are unaccustomed and which has various levels of difficulty; 
establishing the objective probability of success for each subject 
through practice trials at the various levels of difficulty; and 
then allowing a choice of one of those objective probabilities for 
a further task of the same kind; comes far closer than methods 
previously used in studies of n Achievement to providing an 
adequately empirical procedure for assessing and operating upon 
probability of success« The great value of the approach is that, 
all the terms of the experiment being objective and therefore open 
to direct observation, no assi^tions need to be made about the 
values of subjective entities. 
7»1«4« The subjects used. 
Results from correlations with the A.C.E.R.N, show that intelli-
gence so measured is in this study related to none of the motivational 
measures used, lî ile this does little to clarify the conflicting 
results of earlier studies, adding only some further support to 
those who have contended that the motivational factors are independent 
of intelligence (see Heckhausen, 1967), it does demonstrate that 
the intelligence of the subjects has not directly affected the 
results obtained in this study. Although one may expect a decrease in 
the correlation coefficients due to the attenuation of the range 
of intelligence sacpled (but cf. French & Thomas, 1958; Robinson, 1961; 
1954; and tleyer et al, 1965), the coefficients obtained are so small 
as to suggest that even with an increased range of intelligence 
noteworthy correlation coefficients would not be fortbcoming. 
It seems, therefore, most unlikely that the results obtained 
are greatly affected by the general high level of intelligence of 
the subjects per se. It remains possible that educational 
experience may influence the results, but for such a proposition it 
is difficult, at present, to establish any adequate theoretical 
rationale. 
A more plausible suggestion would be that the results are 
influenced by the social groups to which most students belong. 
Katz, Barrett, & Firth (undated) have presented figures showing that 
in 1969, the year before the subjects involved entered the 
University of New South Wales, over 50% of students enrolling at the 
university came from backgrounds which could be described as 
'middle class' and less than from less affluent socio-
economic backgrounds. This is especially significant as the 
subjects were drawn from a College of the university providing this 
data, so the proportions are likely to be approximately the same 
in the sample. 
Heckhausen (1967 citing Rosen, 1956, 1962; Douvan & Adelson, 1958; 
Veroff, Atkinson, Feld, & Gurin, 1960; Littig & Yeracaris, 1963, 1965; 
Carney & WcKeachie, 1963; Nuttall, 1964; and Morgan, 1964) relates 
achievement motivation and socio-economic status in such a way as to 
suggest that the group used in this study in general tend to be biased 
towards a high level of n Achievement. If this is so, the effect 
would be to increase the difficulty of substantiating the hypothesis 
by decreasing the degree to which subjects can be differentiated on the 
achievement motive. This, however, would only serve to strengthen 
any positive results obtained and not to render the results invalid. 
The use of both males and females as subjects has not introduced 
any systematic error into the result. Responses on the T.A.T., T.A.Q. 
and risk choice did not differ significantly in central tendency 
between the two groups. Even though dispersion of male scores was 
significantly greater on risk choice (a result worthy of further 
investigation), this does not invalidate the results because of the 
lack of any similar difference in either of the motivation measures. 
It is therefore concluded that the only systematic effect 
the choice of subjects could possibly have on the results is to 
make it slightly more difficult to obtain significant differences 
between groups where n Achievement is one of the criteria of 
differentiation. 
7.2. Results of major hypotheses. 
7.Z.I. Hypothesis one. 
The median cnoice of risk level tor the three groups oesignatea 
achievement oriented, intermediate and failure oriented were 
consistent with tne predictions stated in tne nypothesis. The 
achievement oriented group chose a median objective success probability 
of .44 wnich represents a level of risK aoove .5u; the taixure 
oriented group median was .52^ a level of risk below .50; and the 
intermediate group median choice was .48, which was both a level of 
risk above .50 and between the other groups. Thus all predictions 
were confirmed. 
Although the medians of the achievement oriented and intermediate 
groups are consistent with the prediction made by Atkinson (1957) 
about objective measuresof difficulty, the result for the failure 
oriented group is clearly contrary to Atkinson's suggestion that the 
failure oriented person most strongly tries to avoid objective levels 
of risk below .50 and that the median risk choice for this group 
should have been at a level of success probability of less than .50. 
The shapes of the choice distribution curves of the three groups 
approximate those of the theoretical curves presented in Fig. 17. 
Because of the arbitrary nature of the parameters underlying those 
theoretical curves^ little more than that can be said at this stage 
of our knowledge. The variation in parameters which would be needed 
to generate curves of the form of the empirical data in this study 
would not be such as to necessitate any alteration in the basic theory. 
For instance, the failure to find an upturn at high levels of risk 
in the distribution for failure oriented subjects, which is not a 
unique finding (Atkinson & Litwin, 1960), demands only that tendency 
to approach success be assigned a value which is at all points 
greater than the value assigned to tendency to avoid failure. 
Thus the results of hypothesis one, albeit statistically crude, 
are entirely in accord with predictions which follow from the 
objective restatement of the theory of achievement motivation. Here 
adequate confirmation was provided by the results of hypothesis two. 
7.2.2. Hypothesis two. 
The relatively high correlation (.76) found between the mean degree 
of achievement orientation of a group and the mean degree of risk that 
group will choose is a strong confirmation of the theory presented in 
this thesis. The complexity of extrinsic motivational factors which 
operate on an individual on any single trial, make it likely that 
significant correlations between individual achievement orientation 
and degree of risk chosen on a single trial will be obscured. In 
fact, in this study a correlation of only .17 was obtained (p < .2). 
The obviation of the effects of extrinsic factors, possible by 
repeated trials on the same individual, or, as herein, by using 
the combined results of a number of individuals, allows the 
influence of the achievement motive and fear of failure to be more 
appropriately assessed. By the grouping employed, achievement 
motivation was shown to account for close to 58^ of the variance 
in risk choice between groups. 
Atkinson's suggestion about the effect of using objective 
measures would not lead one to predict this finding, 
72.3. Hypothesis three. 
Failure to fully confirm the hypothesis that an achievement 
oriented group would choose a significantly higher risk level than 
a failure oriented group is the most disappointing aspect of the 
experiment. However, given the extrinsic motivational effects 
mentioned in relation to hypothesis two, this failure is under-
standable, as their effect would be to greatly increase the 
variability of the choices of individuals and therefore to lower 
considerably the power of the test to discover a difference that 
did exist. Even the t test that came closest to revealing a 
significant difference (the t value being a mere .0071 short of the 
critical value at a .05 level of significance), that between the 
highest and lowest sixteen subjects on achievement orientation, had 
a power of only .33 (assuming H^ : y ̂  ~ ^ 2 " likelihood 
of Type 2 error is very high and other indications strongly suggest 
this to be the case. These indications were the consistency of the 
direction of all the differences with the hypothesised direction; 
the steady increase in the magnitude of the difference between groups 
as more extreme groups were chosen; the steady decrease in the 
likelihood that these differences are due to error effects (the most 
extreme groups represented an exception but the t test does 
represent a halving of the degree of freedom compared with the 
immediately previous comparison); the close approach to significance at 
extreme levels despite the very low power of the test; and the 
strong correlation obtained on hypothesis two. However, the failure 
to be able statistically to reject the null hypothesis means that 
we must, at least, return an open verdict on this hypothesis. 
Further experimentation should increase the power of the test 
by either sampling a larger number of subjects or by lowering the 
variance within groups. The first of these possibilities is further 
desirable because of the small numbers of subjects taking extremes 
of risk as mentioned earlier. The latter suggestion could be 
effected by using the repeated observations of individuals in a 
number of different risk choice situations. This involves the 
assumption that the mean choice of risk level for an individual on 
repeated trials in varying situations tends to the mean risk choice 
of several individuals, of an equal level of achievement orientation, 
on a single task. This will hold to the extent to which the 
extrinsic motivational effects are randomly distributed, as, 
representing error effects, they may be expected to be. However, 
if under one of the above two conditions the difference still failed 
to attain significance the theory would be seriously called into 
question. 
Status of the ob.jective statement of the theory of achievement 
motivation^ 
As an initial test of the theory outlined in Chapter III, the 
results of the experiment are very gratifying. Two of the three 
critical hypotheses were fully confirmed and although confirmation 
uas not forthcoming for the third hypothesis, the results were not 
such as to demand a complete rejection. 
The theory uas able to predict the direction in uhich median 
objective risk choice uould deviate from a .50 level for three groups 
differing on the degree to which achievement or failure orientation 
predominated. Moreover, the degree, as well as the direction, of 
deviation was found to be, as the theory suggests, closely related to 
the strength of the achievement motive relative to fear of failure. 
In the light of the strong support lent to the theory by these two 
findings, the failure to find significant differences between groups 
in mean choice of risk level is not strong enough by itself to disprove 
the theory, especially when consideration is given to the explanation 
proposed above to account for this failure. 
Thus while the failure to validate the third hypothesis demands 
that the theory be not given unequivocal acceptance, the evidence is 
certainly strong enough to argue that the approach shows a great deal 
of promise. The results are definitely such as to promote the attempt 
to set the theory of achievement motivation on a more firmly empirical 
base. 
It remains for the predictions which follow from the theory to be 
tested under a variety of different conditions, including extension into 
such areas as the ujork on persistence. Although the ultimate 
predictions of the full theory have received some support, in 
developing the theory some relationships uere assumed or argued on 
a priori grounds for which there is not as yet adequate empirical 
support. 
Many, such as the relationships between expectancies, incentives 
and objective probability of success, are, of course, not open to 
empirical testing* liihile objective probability of success is open 
to operational definition, expectancy and incentive, being hypothetical 
constructs are not. The attempts by Feather (1965) and Lituin (1958) 
to trace their relationships to subjective probability of success are 
suspect because of the assumed correspondence between expectancy and 
statements about expectancy and between incentive and stated values 
given to success. As intimated earlier, with direct reference to 
Feather's (1955) article, but applying generally, the person with high 
fear of failure has a motivational stake in understating his actual 
probability of success as this effectively lowers the criterion against 
which he may expect to be judged. Similarly, expecting failure he will 
tend to understate the incentive value of success to him to lower the 
sense of loss he will experience. As with Florgan's (1964) results, 
this can be well restated as an exercise in cognitive dissonance, verbal 
statements being made to lessen the dissonance expected to occur after 
failure. 
If then, it is clear that the intervening variables of expectancy 
and incentive are not open to empirical testing, it certainly follows 
that the second order hypothetical variables designated »j«,tk'nfeind «m» 
in this theory are similarly not available for experimental falsifi-
cation, However, in the same luay as it is necessary for intervening 
variables to be anchored to antecedents as uiell as consequents, it 
is also necessary that these antecedents be empirically valid. In 
this case the antecedents upon which the existence and <behaviour' 
of the intervening constructs was premised are open to testing but 
have not as yet been adequately verified. For instance, that people 
high on n Achievement are rewarded for success and those with high 
fear of failure are punished for failure is strongly indicated by 
Uinterbottom (1958), Rosen & D'Andrade (1959), Crandall et al (1960), 
Rosen (1961), Ross & Kagan (1961), fIcGhee & Teevan (1965), Levin & 
Baldwin (1959) and Paivio (1964) when jointly considered, yet it 
would be far preferable if in a single study it could be demonstrated 
that the achievement oriented person has a history of reward for 
success and also relative lack of punishment for failure, that the 
failure oriented show the reverse pattern and that those intermediate 
have a history of relative equivalent degrees of success and failure. 
From this it ought to follow, for instance that children with high 
fear of failure have parents who are equally eager for their children 
to do well and display competence as are the parents of highly achieve-
ment motivated children. It remains to be found whether the effective 
difference between the two groups lies in the reasons for their 
desiring competence in their children or merely in the exercise of 
different child-rearing practices. 
Further, to these studies of antecedents in terms of parental 
attitudes and behaviour, it is necessary to adduce evidence to demonstrate 
that the failure oriented person, despite favouring someuhat less 
objectively difficult or risk prone tasks as measured against capability, 
does in fact fail more often than the more venturesome achievement 
oriented person. 
Certainly, also, in the area of conflict theory to uhich the 
theory of achievement motive has been tied, many questions of detail 
remain unansuered even though the basic theory commands a great deal 
of theoretical and experimental support (filler & Dollard, 1941; 
niller, 1944, 1948, 1951, 1959; Broun, 1948; Dollard & Miller, 1950; 
Rigby, 1954; Yates, 1962, 1965; Kimble, 1964; Maher, 1964, 1966; etc.). 
Findings in conflict theory will have great relevance to the theory 
of achievement motivation and the application of generally applicable 
data about conflict behaviour to the specific case of achievement 
behaviour should prove fruitful. While it is beyond the scope of this 
discussion to explore at depth the predictions which may follow from 
the integration of the fields (beyond the general concept tested), 
achievement motivation theory has concentrated on behaviour in the 
constrained situation, where evaluation of competence cannot be avoided, 
and an advance in understanding achievement behaviour could follow 
from applying what is known of conflict resolution in the free situation 
to the achievement conflict. For instance, achievement motivation theory, 
in insisting that achievement motivation is a constant trait in the 
individual, has not accommodated the possibility that the achievement 
desire may be capable of displacement from certain activities, so that, 
even a person with high n Achievement may not act «typically« in all 
situations. Such work as that of 3anis (1959) could provide an interesting 
area of cross-linking for the theories. 
Comparative utility of the subjective and objective presentations 
of the theory of achievement motivation. 
This study uas not intended as a rejection, but as an extension of 
Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation. Because of its essentially 
subjective character, Atkinson's approach is not open to empirical 
falsification and so the validity, in terms of accuracy of description 
of phenomena, of that theory is not in question. Certainly, its value 
as a conceptual scheme is evident from the uide range of studies which 
it has engendered. 
It is not necessary to rehearse, however, the general value of an 
empirically based theory over one which relies heavily on postulated 
subjective variables, yet,certain specific advantages of the objective 
approach put forward in this thesis may be highlighted. 
Firstly, what were entirely subjective and cognitive elements of 
Atkinson's theory: subjective probability and incentive value of 
success and failure; are transformed into hypothetical constructs tied 
firmly to both antecedent and consequent events which are fully 
objective and empirical in nature. This means that the source, 
development and operation of these constructs are no longer necessarily 
limited to the status of postulates, but may be predicted on the basis 
of certain stimulus events and tested in terms of consequent behaviour. 
The stimulus-response theorist will assert, with justice, that it 
is therefore theoretically possible to restate the theory entirely in 
terms of the antecedents and consequents and without reference to 
hypothesised intervening variables. This, while true, mistakes the role 
of these intervening constructs which is to summarise in gross form 
the effects of an extremely complex variety of stimuli, delivered 
over a long period, and the set of relationships which describe their 
manner of influencing behaviour» It is as such that intervening 
constructs such as expectancy and incentive fulfil a valuable conceptual 
role, A pure S-R theory in this case would be too complex to describe. 
It is not always parsimonious to omit such variables. 
Another advantage closely related to the restatement of the 
intervening variables in objective terms, is the ability, which follows 
therefrom, to fully and directly validate or falsify the theory, as the 
case may be. It should be reiterated that it is not Atkinson's theory 
per se that is so affected, as the predictions which follow from that 
theory and those predictions which follow from an objective theory are 
based on and deal with different entities. Atkinson's theory can 
never be so validated. 
To the theory of achievement motivation has also been added a 
greater degree of specificity in experimental prediction and also of 
possible sophistication of experimental technique. While a theory is 
formulated entirely in terms of unobservables, experimental work can 
only ever be carried out in terms of approximations. Thus, for instance, 
the prediction, which follows from Atkinson's theory, that the achieve-
ment oriented prefer specifically a .50 level of subjective 
probability of success, must be diluted to the empirical proposition that 
they prefer to be near the median of obtained choices. This, of course, 
results from the extreme difficulty of finding a specific operational 
equivalent of the cognitive term. By initially casting the theory in 
objective terms, it is possible to make a direct translation to an 
operational level uiith no loss of precision of meaning of the terms 
employed. 
Additionally, in translation of results back into theoretical 
terms it is less likely that results based on an objective theory u/ill 
gather an accretion of surplus meaning than it is when the terms of the 
theory are themselves necessarily full of surplus meaning relative to 
their operational parallels. 
The fact that subjective entities are not open to direct 
observation is a great limitation upon the practical utility of 
Atkinson's theory as, in one way or another, dependence has alu/ays to 
be placed on the verbal self rating of the person as an accurate rep-
resentation of the subjective factor. Such ratings introduce a high 
possibility of extraneous variables influencing the results in a 
deleterious manner. Particular cases have been instanced in considering 
previous research. On the other hand by basing the theory entirely upon 
objective constructs, it is possible directly to predict for practical 
situations in which it is possible to assess such factors as objective 
levels of ability. 
Perhaps, the major long term advantage of the revised theory of 
achievement motive presented in this thesis is its closer relationship 
to that general stock of data and concepts derived from other areas of 
research in Psychology and so the greater ease with which it can be 
integrated with these other areas. Acceptance of the applicability of 
Miller's, or subsequently, Haher's theory of conflict to the achievement 
situation, presumes the possibility of application of those other fields 
which have been shown to be useful in explaining conflict behaviour, 
to behaviour in achievement related conflicts. An isolated theory 
explaining a particular form of behaviour in terms peculiar to that 
theory, is naturally of less value than a theory uhich can either 
incorporate the constructs of, or systematise the relationship of 
its terms to the terms of, a more diversely appropriate theory. The 
present formulation has done no more than make a first tentative step 
in this direction, but it has demonstrated the possibility and value 
of such a procedure for the theory of achievement motivation. 
So despite the recognised value of Atkinson»s theory in 
conceptualising achievement behaviour, the use of empirical constructs 
and consistency with other psychological theory, uhich are the major 
advances of the revision attempted in this study, increase markedly 
its potential utility. 
Conclusions. 
In general, the results of this study are confirmatory of 
predictions uhich follou from the objective revision of Atkinson's 
theory of achievement motivation. When achievement motivation and 
fear of failure are assessed by the T.A.T. and T.A.Q. respectively, 
achievement oriented subjects tended to prefer levels of risk 
representing an objective probability of success of less than .50 and 
failure oriented subjects chose to take a lower level of risk with an 
objective probability of success greater than .50. Although evidence 
for a significant difference in risk choice between groups differentiated 
on degree of achievement orientation is equivocal, degree and direction 
of mean risk choice for a group can be directly related to the mean 
degree by which achievement motivation exceeds fear of failure for 
that group. 
On the other hand, the attempt to validate the RJ^l.5. as a 
possible substitute for the T,A,T, was entirely unsuccessful as it 
neither was correlated with that test, nor could reproduce any of the 
behavioural trends evident when the T,A,T, was used. The failure 
seems particular to the form in which the slope index has been cast 
in the R.M.S, rather than necessarily general to the slope index 
concept. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this thesis strongly argues the 
case for such a theory of achievement motivation based on objective 
empirical constructs, as that outlined in this thesis. The theory 
itself is at no more than a relatively basic level of development 
but refinement of the nature of the relationships between constructs 
awaits only the results of experimental manipulation of these constructs. 
At the same time, development of the implications of other theories for 
achievement behaviour, which the present approach allows, will mean 
that a far greater sophistication of the constructs and their mutual 
interelationships can be developed by adapting the relationships 
established between constructs in those other theories. 
Therefore, the revision of Atkinson*s theory developed and largely 
validated in this study, makes possible the development of a comprehensive 
theory allowing quite specific predictions and a clear understanding of 
achievement behaviour in a wide range of different contexts. 
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Appendix 1 Facsimile of the Three Sheets Comprising the 
Rev/ised Morgan Scale. 
UNIVERSITY OF NEU SOUTH WALES, 
UOLLONGONG UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, 
DEPARTHENT OF PSYCHOLOGY. 
OCCUPATIONAL DIFFICULTY SCALE 
Various occupations differ in their degree of difficulty. We 
wish to assess whether students can accurately decide upon this 
as a test of their ability to adequately estimate the risk involved 
in 'real' situations. Out of a representative group of 100 male 
3rd form students uhat percentage (to the nearest do you think 
could succeed, that is adequately compete with others and hold their 
position, at each of the following occupations. 






High School Teacher 
Night Uatchman 
Pharmacist 
(Occupations drawn from N.O.R.C. Scale of Occupational Prestige) 
Appendix 1 (Cont/..,) 
OCCUPATIONAL SATISFACTION SCALE 
(After Morgan 1964) 
Ue are interested in hou people compare occupations. How do 
you think most people would feel if a boy of theirs chose each of 
these types of work. You may use one of five responses: not happy, 
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Appendix 2 (Cont/..,) 
Facsimile of Thematic Apperception Response Sheet. 
1. What is happening? Who are the persons? 
2« What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened 
in the past?. 
3. What is being thought? What is wanted? Dy whom? 
4. What will happen? What uill be done? 
Appendix 3 
Facsimile of the Test Anxiety questionnaire Form. 
TEST ANXIETY QUESTIONMAIRE 
COLLEGE FORH 
THE FlIDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE. DO NOT HESITATE TO PUT A MARK 
(X) ON ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT MARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELING OR ATTITUDE. 
Section 1 
The following questions relate to your attitude touard and experi-
ence with yroup intelligence or aptitude tests. By group intelligence 
tests we refer to tests which are administered to several individuals 
at a time. These tests contain different types of items and are usually 
paper and pencil tests with answers requiring either fill-ins or choices 
of several possible answers. Scores on these tests are given with 
reference to the standing of the individual within the group tested 
or within specific age and educational norms. The College Entrance 
Board tests which you have taken represnet this type of test. Please 
try to remember how you usually reacted toward these tests and how you 
felt while taking them. 
1. How valuable do you think group intelligence tests are in determining 
a person's ability? 
Very valuable Valuable in some respects Valueless 
and valueless in others 
2. Do you think that group intelligence tests should be used more wide-
ly than at present to classify students? 
Should be used less Should be used as at present Should be used 
widely more widely 
3. Would you be willing to stake your continuance in College on the out-
come of a group intelligence test which has previously predicted 
success in a highly reliable fashion? 
Very willing Uncertain Not willing 
4. If you know that you are going to take a group intelligence test, how 
do you feel beforehand? 
Feel very unconfident riidpoint Feel very 
confident 
5. After you have taken a group intelligence test, how confident do 
you feel that you have aone your best? 
l-eei very unconrident i'iidpoint Feel veyy unconfident 
When you are taking a group intelligence test, to what extent do 
your emotional feelings interfere with or lower your performance? 
Do not interfere at all Midpoint Interfere a great 
deal 
taking a group intelligence test, to what extent are you 
aware of an 'uneasy' feeling? 
Am very much aware of it midpoint Am not aware of it 
at all 
^hile taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you 
experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Midpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
9» Before taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you 
experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Plidpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
10, Uhile taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you worry? 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
Before taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you worry 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
12. While taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you perspire? 
Perspire not at all Midpoint Perspire a lot 
13. Before taking a group intelligence test to what extent do you perspire? 
Perspire not at all Midpoint Perspire a lot 
14. In comparison with other students how often do you think of uays 
of avoiding a group intelligence test? 
Less often than Midpoint Hore often than 
other students other students 
THE niDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE. DO NOT HESITATE TO PUT A MARK 
(X) ON ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT MARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELINGS OR «TTITUDE. 
THE f'UDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE. DO NOT HESITATE TO PUT A FIARK 
(X) ON ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT NARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELING OR ATTITUDE. 
SECTION II 
The follouiing questions relate to your attitude toward individual 
intelligence tests and your experience luith them. By individual 
intelligence tests lue refer to tests which are administered to one 
individual at a time by an examiner. These tests contain different 
types of items and thus present a variety of tasks. Those tasks can 
be both verbal and manipulative, i.e. verbal or written answers to 
questions or manipulation of objects such as is involved in puzzles, form 
boards, etc. Examples of tests of this type woujd be the Stanford-
Binet test and the Uechsler-Bellevue test. Please tryp to remember how 
you have usually reacted toward these tests or how you would expect 
to react to them. 
16. Have you ever taken any individual intelligence tests? 
YES NO (CiiDle the appropriate answer) 
IF your answer to the above question is YES, indicate in the 
questions below how you do or did react to individual intelligence 
tests. 
IF your answer to the above question is NO, indicate in the 
following questions how you think you would react to or feel about 
individual tests. 
17. liihen you were taking an individual intelligence test, to what 
extent do (or would) your emotional feelings interfere with your 
performance? 
Uould not interfere Midpoint would interfere a 
with it at all great deal 
18. If you know that you are going to take an individual intelligence 
test, how do you feel (or expect that you would feel) beforehand? 
Would feel very Midpoint Would feel very 
unconfident confident 
19. While you are taking an individual intelligence test, how confident 
do you feel (or expect that you would feel) that you are doing your 
best? 
Would feel very Midpoint Would veel very 
confident unconfident 
you have taken an individual intelligence test, hou 
confident do you feel (or expect that you would feel) that you 
have done your best? 
Would feel very un- Midpoint LJould feel very 
confident confident 
^^^ taking an individual intelligence test, to uhat extent are 
you (or would you be) auare of an »uneasyf feeling? 
Am not auare of it at all i^idpoint Am very much auiare of it 
While taking an individual intelligence test to uhat extent do 
you (would you) experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Midpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
Before taking an individual intelligence test to what extent do 
you (would you) experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Hidpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
^hile taking an individual intelligence test to what extent do 
you (would you) worry? 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
Before taking an individual intelligence test to what extent do 
you (would you) worry? 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
26. While taking an individual intelligence test to what extent do you 
(would you) perspire? 
Wouia never perspire riiopoint Wouia perspire a lot 
¿y. perure taking an individual intelligence test to what extent do 
you (would you) perspire? 
Would never perspire Midpoint Would perspire a lot 
28, In comparison to other students, hou often do you (uould you) 
think of luays of avoiding taking an individual intelligence test? 
Flore often than other Midpoint Less often than other 
students students. 
THE MIDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE. DO NOT HESITATE TO PUT A MARK 
(X) ON ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT MARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELING OR ATTITUDE. 
THE FlIDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDAMCE. DO HOT HESITATE TO PUT A MARK 
(X) OM ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT PIARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELING OR ATTITUDE, 
SECTION III 
The folloiuing questions relate to your attitude touard and 
experience with course examinations. We refer to major examinations, 
such as mid—terms and finals, in all courses, not specifically in any 
one course. Tryp to represent your usual feelings and attitudes toward 
these examinations in general, not touiard any specific examination 
you have taken. hJe realize that the comparative ease or difficulty 
of a particular course and your attitude toward the subject matter 
of the course may influence your attitude toward the examinations; 
however, we would like you to try to express your feelings toward course 
examinations generally. Remember that your answers to these questions 
will not be available at any time, to any of your instructors or to 
any official of the University. 
29. Before taking a course examination, to what extent are you aware 
of an *uneasy' feeling? 
Am not aware of it f^idpoint Am very much aware 
at all of it 
30. When you are taking a course examination, to what extent do you 
feel that your emotional reactions interefere with or lower your 
performance? 
Do not interfere with Hidpoint Interfere with it 
it at all a great deal 
31. If you know that you are going to take a course examination how 
do you feel beforehand? 
Feel very unconfident Midpoint Feel very confident 
32. After you have taken a course examination, how confident do you 
feel that you have done your best? 
Feel very unconfident Midpoint Feel very confident 
33. IjJhile taking a course examination, to what extent do you 
experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Midpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
QS^OI^Q taking a course examination, to what extent do you 
experience an accelerated heartbeat? 
Heartbeat does not Midpoint Heartbeat noticeably 
accelerate at all accelerated 
^hile taking a course examination, to luhat extent do you worry? 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
36. Before taking a course examination to uhat extent do you worry? 
Worry a lot Midpoint Worry not at all 
^hils taking a course examination, to what extent do you perspire? 
Never perspire Midpoint Perspire a lot 
Before taking a courye examination, to what extent do you perspire? 
Never perspire Midpoint Perspire a lot 
39. When, in your opinion, you feel well prepared for a course exam-
ination, how do you usually feel just before the examination? 
Confident Midpoint Anxious 
THE MIDPOINT IS ONLY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, DO NOT HESITATE TO PUT A MARK 
(X) ON ANY POINT ON THE LINE AS LONG AS THAT MARK REFLECTS THE STRENGTH 
OF YOUR FEELING OR ATTITUDE. 
Appendix 4 
Facsimile of Experimental Instruction Sheets. 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
RING TOSS ABILITY 
The first part of this experiment involves our assessment of your 
absolute ability at the ring toss (quoits). You will receive six 
opportunities to throw the quoits at each of the distances marked out 
on the floor. Please record on the graph belou the number of time out 
of six you are able to get at least 2 (tuo) out of 3 (three) quoits on 








0. rrh , i ,1 , i I I. ,1 JL_i I L 
Distance from peg. 
* 
You will notice no absolute sizes are given. You will write in the 
distances yourself beginning with the last level at which you can still 
achieve two out of three six times. 
Appendix 4 (Cont/.,.) 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 2. 
ABILITY/RISK JUDGEFIENT 
We wish to find out uhich students can most accurately appraise 
their own capacity where some risk of failure is involved. The 
successful student will be the student who can successfully score two 
out of three in the ring toss on one trial at the highest level of 
risk in relation to his own basic ability. Thus if you score 2 out 
of 3 when you have only 2 chances in 6 of doing so (according to the 
graph you plotted earlier) you will do better than someone who 
succeeds at a 4 chances in 5 level. But if you fail to get 2 rings on 
the peg, the person who succeeds at a safer level will do better than 
you. ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY APPRAISE THAT LEUEL OF RISK WHICH IS THE 
HIGHEST AT UHICH A PERSON CAN PERFORM SUCCESSFULLY (even on simple 
motor tasks) IS CLOSELY RELATED TO A STUDENT'S ABILITY TO COPE bilTH THE 
CHOICE SITUATIONS INVOLUED IN DOING A COURSE AT A UNIVERSITY TYPE 
INSTITUTION. 
Distance: 
Probability of success: 
No. of quoits landing on peg: 
Appendix 5 
Summary of Rau Data 
Table 9. Means, standard deviations and numbers of subjects providing 
results for the T.A.T,, R.M.S.^T.A.Q and A.C^E.R.N, 
Test Mean Standard Deviation Number of Subjects 
T.A.T, 7.33 6.10 82 
R.M.S. • 42 .16 82 
T.A.Q. 171.02 36.77 82 
ACERN (score) 46.81 8.04 72 
ACERN (I.Q. 
equivalent) C.121 c.7.5 72 
Table 10. Frequency distribution of choice of objective probability of 
success. 
Success Probability Frequency 
1.00 3 
.83 2 
.67 15 
.50 33 
.33 21 
.17 6 
0.00 2 
